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Eclipsing Sovereignty: 
The Legitimacy of Humanitarian Intervention1 
Kurt Mills, Ph.D. 
"'We were so riveted to the problem of 
sovereignty ..., but a country's sovereignty doesn't 
give it the right to do what was happening in the 
Sudan.'" 
-US Official2 
In the wake of recent humanirarian crises and varying international responses to such 
situations, the debate with respect to international intervention on humanitarian grounds has 
grown dramatically.3 There u e  d l s  for more intervention while, at the same rime, many of those 
who rmght be targets of intervention have raised the specter of sovereignty, daiming "domestic 
jurisdiction" for their genocidal acts. While there is increasing international support for 
interventions to respond to a variety of humanitarian crises, the issue of the legitimacy of such 
actions by the United Nations or other bodia has not been fully articdated. 
This paper is an attempt to establish a legitimate basis for humanitarian intervention in a 
world of nominally sovereign states. I do this from two perspectives. First, I examine the legal 
discussions regarding such intervention, and I ague that a norm of justified intervention can be 
found in the UN Charter, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and human rights 
covenants, as well as developing practice. Second, I examine the moral legitimacy of such actions. 
Specifically, I argue that beyond whatever basis may be present in international law for human 
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rights and intervention to protect those rights, one can find a foundation for such rights in the 
very nature of the state system. Further, I argue that sovereignty cannot be a basis to prevent 
humanitarian intervention because the responsibilities which accrue to stares m a n  that human 
rights must be seen as a part of the definition of sovereignty, rather than in opposition to it. In 
addition, within the concept of sovereignty, there is not only a right for the international 
community to violate international boundaries on behalf of human rights, but an obligation to do 
so. This derives from a reconuived notion of the relationship between the individual and the 
international cornmuniry which has begun to evolve in recent years. 
What is required, in other words, is to break free from what Camilleri and Fdk call the 
"sovereignty discourse," which they characterize as "a way of describing and thinking about the 
world in which nation-states are the principal actors, the principle centres of power, and the 
principle objects of inter~st."~ It creates the illusion that the current array of power and authority 
is natural and acts a 'hndamental source of truth and meaning'"5 for discussion of power and 
rights and legitimacy. The focus of the discussion needs to move from states as objects of 
intervention and their right not to be intervened in, towacd the subjects of humanitarian action -- 
people -- and their rights outside any narrow view of state sovereignty as well as their place within 
the broader international wmmunity. I argue that moving away from the sovereignty discourse 
where states are the final arbiters of rights involves reconceptualizing sovereignty to include human 
rights such that srates or the international wmmunity cannot ignore abuses of those rights. 
I thus conclude that a legitimate basis for multilateral humanitarian intervention can be 
found both within international law and recent practice, and a moral geography which transcends 
international legal norms. 
4~oseph A. Camillcri and Jim Fdk, The End of Soiduereigny?: The PoIitics of a Shrinking and Fragmenting World, 
(Bmokfield, VT: Ashgate Publishing Company, 1992): 2. 
Slbid., p. l I .  
Access and Intervention 
Intervention in the emerging global order is a multi-faceted phenomena. At its core are 
transborder forceful efforts to influence a government or the outcome of an internationally- 
relevant situation, regardless of whether a government is involved. It can indude activities such as 
overthrowing a government or annexing territory by force. However, it can also include more 
ambiguous forceful action which may involve government acquiescence or resistance, may indude 
thc acquiescence or resistance of a rebel group, and is done by a state or international 
governmental organization, to address a security or humanitarian problem in a particular territory 
(recognizing, of course, that the rwo frquently cannot be separated). Humaniurian intervention 
involves a situation where the humanitarian aspects are the primary hctors in the decision to 
intervene and are the main focus of the action, including action within the traditional security 
realm which may mitigate the humanitarian situation. 
Outside of the stria realm of intervention, one can point to the concept of humanitarian 
access. This includes instances where the UN or d d  organizations negotiate with governments to 
gain access to &cd populations in the midst of civil wan or other humanitarian emergencies, or 
whcre humanitarian access is obtained without the consent of a government, with no military 
component in both cases. The distinction bmeen  the two is important. First, it is only state or 
state organizations which have the resources to undertake interventions, while a wide variety of 
actors can engage in hurnanitarim access activities. Second, the legal basis for humanitarian acms 
is somewhat di&rent than that fbr intervention. Third, the different nature of thc rwo activities 
has implications for how they may be conceptualized within discourses about sovereignty. 
One signscant question is the extent to which peacekeeping activities might Mi under the 
rubric of intervention. Certainty traditional peacekeeping operations would not since the basic 
premise is that d parties to a conflict have accepted the peacckeepers' presence. Further, the 
military component of traditional peacekeeping has been relatively small. However, there have 
been instances recently where peacekeepers have bund themselves in rather ambiguous situations 
where not all parties have accepted their presence, where they have come under significant attack 
by one or more of the parties to a conflict, or where the mandare of the peacekeeping operation 
has been gradually changed to include increasingly more enforcement (that is military) activities. 
At this point, such as in the cases of Somalia and the former Yugoslavia, the line between 
peacekeeping and intervention becomes significantly blurred, and the international community is 
drawn into interventionary activity whether it had intended it or not. 
Intervention: The Legal Framework 
The legal status of humanitarian intervention is contested. However, one can say at the 
beginning that, in general, intervention violates most interpretations of customary as well as 
codified international law. The basis of this prohibition is the recognized status of states as 
sovereign. That is, states are regarded as the primary unit of organization and politicd integrity in 
international affairs. International law is concerned, esscntially, with interactions between states, 
and what happens inside a state, including the treatment of nationals within their state, is outside 
of the purview of international law. As will be discussed below, one may be able to find 
exceptions to this rule; it is, nonetheless, a commonly accepted rule. Yet, individuals are also 
increasingly becoming subjects of international law,G with a concomitant relative decline in the 
stature of states. 
As opposed to earlier times when the use of force in international affairs was regarded as a 
state's right, there has evolved a general presumption against the usc of force. This presumption 
that the use of force is unacceptable was codified in the Charter of the United Nations, article 
2(4) of which states: "All members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat ot 
use of force q i n s t  thc territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any other 
manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations." This does not address economic 
coercion which, as long as it did not included military activity such as a blockade, would 
presumably be legal.' However, since most conceptions of, and indeed actual actions of, 
6~arar Chopra,The New Subjecrs o f  Internarional Law" Brown Foreign Aj&in/srmol (Spring 1991): 27-30. 
Tother documents, such as the Charter of  the Organization of  American States, specificilly include economic 
interference. Article 15 of the OAS Charrer rut*: 'No State or group of States has the right to intervene dirmly or 
intervention include military activity, artide 2(4) would seem to outlaw unilateral or bloc 
intervention. Article 51 of the Charter codified another principle of international law which 
allowed the use of force by a state in self-defense. Article 2(7) proscribes most intervention by the 
United Nations: 
Nothing contained in the present Charter shall authorize the United Nations to 
intervene in matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any state or 
shall require the Members to submit such matters to settlement under the present Charter; 
but this principle shall not prejudice the application of enforccrnenc measures under 
Chapter VII. 
W~thin this paragraph, however, are two phrases which raise flags regarding the legality of 
UN action. First, there is the problem of deciding exactly what falls under the domestic 
jurisdiction of a state. Generally, it has been assumed that just about anything which does not go 
beyond a state's border is within the exclusive jurisdiction of the stare. This includes form of 
government, economic arrangements, and the way a government treats its people. Falk denies 
that states have actually exercised the autonomy which is generally attributed to states: 
[I]n fict, the domestic order has never enjoyed autonomy in any strict sense. It is now 
commonplace to accept the interdependence of economic, cultural, and miIitary f i r s .  
In fact, nations have always had a vital concern with what goes on elsewhere, even if 
clsewhere is a fbreign state. Sovereignty only confers a primary competence upon a nation; 
it is not, and never was, an exclusive compe~ence.~ 
This primary competence would, presumably, include whatever is essentially domestic, as opposed 
to what might &a another state. Falk's essay was written thirty years ago, and would have been 
very hotly contested then. While it may still be contared today, there is a growing awareness chat 
the world is becoming more interdependent and that massive human rights abuses, for example, 
& other states by creating refugee situations in other countries. 
In addition to being concerned with these direct effects and consequences, there have 
evolved in the international system certain principles which are recognized as unchanging. These 
indirectly. for any rason Aatstxver, in the internal or e x m d  &airs of any other Snte. Thc foregoing principle 
prohibits not only armed brcc but also any other form o f  interference or arrernpred thrar against the personaliry of the 
Sure or againn in political, economic and cultural elements." 
8~ ichud Fdk, T h e  Legitimacy of Legislntivc Intervention by the Unitcd Nations," in Raland J. Sunger, cd., f i q s  
on InrmKtrrion (Ohio State Univeniry Prm, 1901): 36. 
fill under the term jw cognrs, or principles from which there can be no derogation. These include, 
among others, prohibitions against torture, slavery, and genocide. They arc manifestly illegal 
under international law, and therefore would not fall under domestic jurisdiction. They have been 
codified in various treaties and conventions; however, regardless of whether or not a state has 
ratified these conventions, it is still bound by these principles. Not all governments have ratified 
these conventions (although all members of the UN have accepted the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights (UDHR)), but the fact of their existence further demonstrates the acceptance, as 
well as the actuality, of Falk's analysis of interdependence. In fact, as Newrnan has observed: "we 
have plenty of precedents to establish that crimes against humanity [including genocide] are not 
essentially within the domestic jurisdiction."9 Or, as Kutner has written, " h i d e  2, paragraph 7 of 
the Charter which predudes the United Nations from interfering in matters which are 'cssentidly 
within the domestic jurisdiction of any state' may not be interposed because the member states 
have obliged themselves to promote hndamental human rights."1° More generally, a number of 
observers have argued that the Universal Declaration of Human Rights has authority beyond 
being "a common standard of achievement for all peoples and nations." Reisman notes that it is 
"now accepted as declaratory of customary international law."I1 Delupis argues chat the UDHR 
is perceived as having "'considerable auth~riry.'"'~ In fict, she argues that it contains rules which 
are jw cogm: 
I submit that a number of rules contained in the Universal Declaration of Human 
R~ghts are peremptory norms from which derogation, either by legidation or treaty is not 
permitted. Funhermore, a number of ruler laid down in the conventions on genocide and 
slavery also have this character and bind third states by virtue of forming part of the 
general principles of international law .... the Universal Declaration, which does not itself 
constirute a binding document, lays down rules which, irrespeaive of whether they are 
embodied in a binding document or not, are binding as customary internationd law. No 
9Fnnk Newman in Rjchard B. Lillich, ed.. H~dnranirarian Inarwntion and 3 c  Unitcd Nncionr. {Charlortcsville: 
University of Virginia Press, 1973): l l l. 
1 ° ~ u i s  Kucner, "Wodd Habeas Corpus ahd Humanitarian Intervention." Vdpurrai~o Univmity t a w  Rtvinv, 19 
nn 1985): 61 1. 
(IP 'l$, Midnel Rasmn.  uSovercignry and Hwmn Rights in Conaporary International LW,* A t l ~ i c a n  / o w d  
.fI~mnafional &W, 84 (October 1930): 867. 
'*[rigrid Delupis, Intcmtionrrl Law and thr IndLprndclrt State, (New York: Crane, Rusrak. 1974): 132. 
state can rightly believe after the Niirnberg trials that international law, in the absence of 
treaties, contains no rules which forbid atrocities and gnodde.l3 
Most recently, the 171 states at the World Conference on Human Rights reaffirmed, in 
the Vienna Declaration, the universality of human rights. The declaration recognized that "the 
promotion and protection of all human rights is a legitimate concern of the international 
~ornrnuniry."~~ 
Further, what is considered essentially domestic changes. As the Permanent Court of 
International Justice maintained in 1923: "'the question of whether a certain matter is or is not 
solely within the jurisdiction of a state is an essentially relevant question; it depends on the 
development of international reIations.'"l5 Therefore, as Pease and Forsythe observe, "there may 
be no permanent demarcation berween internal and international affairs, between domestic and 
international jurisdiction within which aurhority is exercised, but only a sliding relative 
difference."'6 Thus, colonialism, which was not considered to be an international issue became 
one. And, the rights of individds and groups have found their place on the international agenda. 
The actual role of the international communiry with respect to such issues may stitl be somewhat 
ambiguous and in a state of flux, but that is the nature of a system where terms of reference seem 
to change from time to time. In fact, attempting to fur a boundary between the domestic and the 
international is htile and misleading.I7 
'3~tlupis, p. 133. 
I 4 ~ o r l d  Conference on Human Rights, Thr Vimnu Dcrfarurion and Progtwmmr of Acfion, (United Nations 
Dqmrunmt of Public information, June, 1993): 30. 
' 5 ~ u o c d  in Kelly-Kate PCZK and David P. Fonythc, 'Humanitarian lnrelvention and international Law," 
A u ~ t r i a n ] o u d o f ~ i c a n d I ~ ~ w .  45 (1993): 3. 
16~case and Forsythe, p. 3. 
17As Rabctt Pastor mints o u t  .- 
The vvch for the right boundary line between domestic rights and inccmationd responsibilities is a futile 
one. b a d  on m errant premise of bihuted jurisdictions. In the contempomy world it is hard ro find an issue 
or m interest that is either wholly domestic or complcrely international. Most i w a  or problems are domestic, 
with a residual component that is international. For a m p l e ,  the famine in Somalia has domestic origins md 
in the long term a n  bc rcmlved only by Somalis, but the international community has a residual humanitarian 
responsibility to prevent massive samtion .... 
The search for a boundary between domesric and international is worse than usclcss. it is mislading. 
The primary isuc should be not the division of responsibilities between governments and 10s but how the 
international community shodd pereivc and respond to collective problems. 
R o k  A. Pastor. "Forward to the &ginning: Widening the Scope for Global Coilcctivc Actton," in Luri W. Reed and 
Gr l  Gysen, eh., Enmging N o m  ofJushjkdfntmvdun: A C o b t i o n  of k f m m  a Pmjm of #be Amcrkan Acadnnj 
ofAm andScKnm, (Cambridge, M Committee on International Security Studies, 1993): 138. 
Having demonstrated that there is a certain dass of activities which are recognized as not 
being within the realm of domestic jurisdiction, or, more properly, that most issues have some sort 
of international component, what can one then say about how violations of humanitarian principles 
should be handled? One way of looking at it is by reference to the last phrase of article 2(7) of the 
UN Charter which refers to Chapter V11 of the Charter. 'Chapter V11 deals with actions -- 
military as well as nonmilitary -- which can be authorized by the Security Council. Artide 33 
refers to a "threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of kression" which might justify UN 
military action. It can be argued that certain acts, while violating the principles ofjuc cugms or 
other priiciplcs might, nonetheless, not be a threat to the peace. As Falk points out, however: 
One can assen the preliminary legitimacy of United Nations intervention [in such 
situations as internal wars] merely by suggesting the very obvious threat to international 
peace that exists whenever nudear nations invest their prestige and power in the outcome 
of an internal war. Wherever action is necessary to eliminate such risks, the United 
Nations seems authorized, if not obliged, to take action.18 
In addition, Falk suggests that the UN can act when 'domestic insurgency express[es] 
fundamental preferences of the world comrnunicy."'9 A threat to the peace might also occur 
when an internal war or other situation, such as a h i n e ,  created a situation where there is massive 
movement of people across state boundaries, u has happened in a number of instances in recent 
years. Finally, one might include "fundamental preferences of the world community," as 
expressed in the documents and principles discussed above, without requiring that an insurgency 
be taking place. Of course, having to resort to a "threat to the peace" as the basis for humanitarian 
action is inherently statist and is firmly rooted in the sovereignty discourse becluse it is only states 
which c a ~ ~  be affecred by a "threat to the peace." 
One can also imagine other action taken by the UN which is not military in nature. 
Indeed, there already exists a certain amount of human rights machinery in the UN, including the 
UN Human Rights Commission. However, past practice has shown that as presently constituted 
these mechanisms cannot deal effectively with massive human rights abuses. There are essentially 
I8hlk in Stanger, pp. 48-9. 
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A significant reason why these, and many other, scholars support unilateral humanitarian 
intervention is that the UN has not met the origind expeaations of collective actions in response 
to "threats to  the peace" and the likc.25 One need only to look at the widespread violations of 
human rights worldwide and the paucity of UN response to these activities, as well as the lack of 
machinery to deal with these issues, to see this point.26 Certainly the fate and inadequate forceful 
response to the genocide in Bosnia-Henegovina illustrates this, although, as will be discussed 
below, one m&t discern a small crack in the wall of indifference, 
States act in their own interest, and usually any action which might be in the interest of 
another state, group, or individual is secondary to the acting state's interests. So it is with any 
kind of intervention, including humanitarian intervention. It is difficult to find exampla where 
states have acted unilaterally with little or no self-interest27 to help foreign nationals in another 
state. Two recent examples which arc put forth as unilateral humanitarian intervention will 
illustrate this point. These are India's invasion of East Pakistan in 1971 in response to the 
slaughter by the West Pakistan Army and Tanzania's invasion of Uganda in 1979 to overthrow Idi 
Amin's b r u d  regime. 
India's intervention in Pakistan rcsuItcd in the creation of the state of Bangladesh from 
what had been East Pakistan. The East Pakistanis were being brutally treated by West Pakistan. 
The W e t  Pakistan army was slaughtering East Pakistanis on a massive scale and engaging in rape 
and pillage. An estimated 9 million rehew flowed across the border into India, cenainly enough 
to be identified as a threat to international peace and security under contemporary usage of the 
2 5 ~ o r  example. Fonteyne state: 'the en?klirhmcnt of  machinery for collective security and enforcement was so basic 
a condition for the Mcmbcrs of the United Nations in surrendering their right under customary international Iaw to use 
for= for a variety of  rcarons, that failure by the Organization to crate this machinery would partially relieve the 
Member sates of  their obligation ofmrrainr under the Charter.' Quoted in Bazyler, p. 579. 
%B+, pp. 578-8 1. 
27~iscucsion of self-intcrest in this manner [as in conflict with upholding human rightcl is manr to reflect the 
current reality that, in gcncnl, states do not include the protection o f  human rights as a major factor in calculating 
national interea. This may be changing somewhat, as at lcvr a few states have to deal with the fallout of human rights 
abuses, e,pecidly refugees crossing their borders, or as orhen ~ e e  the upholding of humans rights as conducive to long- 
term international stability and democratic processes of  decision-making. A new view of df-interest may emerge in the 
hture; however, since self-inrerest does not, in general include human rights, the ensuing discussion will be premised on 
this reality. 
term, and also enough to create an interest in the conflict on the part of India.28 The East 
Pakistanis demanded independence and, in light of what was happening, India invaded and 
defeated the West Pakistan army. The state of Bangladesh was created. Although the Indian 
ambassador to the UN stated that "'we have on this particular occasion absolutely nothing but the 
purest of motives and the purest of intentions: to rescue the people of East BengaI from what they 
are suffering,'"29 this was not a selfless act on the part of India. India and Pakistan were longtime 
rivals, and this crisis gave India the opportunity to decrease its rival's power. Even given this 
motive, however, many observers credit this action as being a leading case of humanitarian 
intervention. For example, Fonteyne states that India's "course of action in the Bangladesh 
situation probably constitutes the dearest case of forceful individual humanitarian intervention in 
this century.'"30 Yet, in the end, India did not invoke the doctrine of humanitarian intervention 
d e n  it invaded.31 Also, as Fairley points out, "the brunt of the effort borne in the preservation of 
human life and dignity was undertaken by the United Nations' relief effort, the largest 
entertained since rhe conclusion of the Second World War.*32 One hundred and five members of 
the General Assembly supported a resolution declaring India's actions unlawful. Therefore, 
Hwan concludes, given the General Assembly vote and the fact that India did not invoke this 
doctrine, this case was not a true application of the doctrine of humanitarian intervention.33 
The second case put forth as supporting humanitarian intervention is Tanzania's invasion of 
Uganda in 1979. Idi Amin's regime in Uganda from 1971 to 1979 has been recognized as one the 
most brutal regimes the world has seen. The government engaged in massive human tights 
abuses, and as many as 300,000 Ugandans may have been acecuted. Yet, President Jutius 
Nyerere's decision to intervene was motivated at least in part by nonhumanitarian interests. There 
was very little activity on thc part of the outside wodd in response to Amin's barbarity. The West 
28~riaide Zolberg, Artri Suhrke, and Sergio Aguayo, Exape From VhLncc, (New York: Oxford Univcrsiry Press, 
1989 344 
k Q u k l  in Fairley, p. 52. 
%&otcd in buyls ,  p. 589. 
3'~aykr. p. 589. 
32Fairley, p. 52. 
3 3 ~ u s n ,  in Bazyler, pp. 589-M. 
only instituted modest economic sanctions after several years and provocations involving US and 
British nationals, and African and Islamic countries resisted admitting that the situation was a 
legitimate international concern. There was longstanding animosity between Uganda and 
Tanzania, and in the fall of 1978 Uganda attempted to annex 710 square miles of Tanzanian 
territory, although Tanzania forced out the troops by December. Tanzania invaded in 1979, 
overthrowing h i n .  White the invasion created economic hardships on Tanzania, it would seem 
plausible to conclude that at least the timing, and possibly the hct of the invasion itself, can be 
explained by self-interest. While one observer notes that the invasion was limited and that "events 
in Uganda proceed today without effective Tanzanian interference," another notes that several 
thousand troops were Icfi behind in Uganda &er Amin's troops were eliminated and that 
Tanzania itself seemed relucrant to use humanitvian intervention as a justification at the July 1979 
OAU surnmit.34 As Martha Finnemore writes: "In fict, Tanzania went our of her way to disclaim 
responsibiIity for the felicitous humanitarian outcomes of her actions. She claimed only that she 
was acting in response to Arnin's invasion and that her actions just happened to coincide with a 
revolt against Amin inside Uganda."35 
Given that the legality of unilateral humanitarian intervention is contested, and given that, 
at least in the above instances, national interest played a pur in these actions, what can or should 
be done rcgudmg such unilateral actions? Can unilateral action be severed from national interest? 
It would seem highly doubtful that this would occur. The commitmcnt of troops and other 
resources means that the intervening state must see some compelling reason for it to act. It seems 
higldy unlikely that either the elites or the public in any country wouId sec much value in sending 
troops to be killed for something which did not entail some sort of gain for the intervening 
state.36 As in most foreign rdations, and especially in this area of military matters, current state 
Buyler, pp. 59-92: Jack Donnelly, 'Human Rights. Humanitarian Intervention and American Foreign 
Pdi " Journalofln Afkr, 73 (Winter 1384): 3 16-17. 
gllhlmha P i n n c ~ o n s t r u c t i n g  Norms of Humanitarian Intervention." pnpared for delivery at the 1991 
Annual Meeting of the International Studies Association, Washington, DC, March 29-April 1, 1994, p. 33. 
36rhe ongoing relucrance and arnbivllcnce in the United Sutcs with respect CO cornmining troops to a UN force in 
Boznia-Hencgovina ccrcainIy demonstrates this attitude. 
practice does not begin with humanitarian motives. Fdk is not sanguine about this possibility of 
separating out state interests: 
I am very skeptical about the sensitivity of principal governments to the values at stake, 
the consistency of that sensitivity, so as not to feel comfortable about giving legal sanction 
to the doctrine of humanitarian intervention under contemporary conditions.37 
Intervention, in general, is done by large stares to small states; indeed, ir would be foolish 
for a small, weak state to attempt action against a much larger state. In addition, intervention is 
usually even more restricted to great powers. Yet, it is difficult to point to any act of intervention 
which they have undertaken and labeI it as humanitarian, or even having much of a humanitarian 
component at aI1.38 As Falk observes: '[great power intervention] is inevitably going to be 
connected with foreign policy because that is what the decisions ultimately relate to, whether or 
not or under whar conditions to project power in foreign societies."39 For this reason, ELlen Frey- 
Wouters suggests that non-aligned states would be better candidates to conduct humanitarian 
intervention activities. Yet, it would be hard to find such state which would have the capacity to 
engage in such activities. Even if one could find a non-aligned state, 'good-faith neutrdi v... is 
very difficult to achievc."40 In addition, William Rogers points to a number of other reasons why 
unilateral intervention should not be sanaionod: 
any time the great powers intervene unilaterally, the dcstabilizing effect is so substantial 
and the encroachment to individual national personalities in the target State (and in J1 of 
the States which have identified themselves with the target State) and the consequences in 
terms of values &cted are so great, that a very powerfid presumption, in my judgment, is 
created against any great power intervention. 
We see the constant misuse of the acuse of protection of one's own nationals for great 
power purposes. . . .4' 
And, of course, the excuse of protecting nonnationals is open to abuse, too. 
Finally, some point to the actions on the part of several countries on behalf of Kurds in 
Iraq &er the Gulf War as an argument for unilateral intervention. The question of whether those 
37h Liliich, ed, p. 33- 
38The actions o f  the US in Somalia may bc onc instance, which wilt be discussed below. 
3% Lillich, p. 73. 
4% Lillich, pp. 52-3. 
411n Lillich, pp. 71-2. 
activities were unilateral or done within the mandate of resolution 688 is debatable.42 However, if 
one does accept that they were outside the bounds of UN action, this still might not be reasonable 
justification to accept unilateral intervention. As Payan Akhavan argues: 
the consequences of the Allied actions in Iraqi Kurdistan are unquestionably positive from 
a human rights perspective and evince a compelling argument in favour of a permissive 
rule dowing for unilateral humanitarian intervention by armed force. However, the fact 
that uprodemocracy" American invasion in countries such as Grenada, Niwagua and 
Panama -- which was actuated by very different and questionable motives -- is arbitrarily 
equated by some jurists with "humanitarian intervention," underscores the potential for 
abuse of such a doctrine.43 
Yet, as Burns Weston points out: "if we are to limit humanitarian intervention to global 
organizational intervention or its quivalent, then we are not talking about the real world.*44 As 
will be seen, at least up to the present time, Weston is essentially correct, although this may be 
changing somewhat. Some support unilateral intervention because the machinery -- such as the 
Military Staff Committee -- was never established in the UN. as well as the fact that it has been 
virtually impossible to get the members, and especially the permanent members, of the security 
council to agree and act. John Moore points out that at least sometimes multilaterd action will 
not be fiasible. such as in an emergency or in a highly politicized context. He would allow 
unilateral action under very stringent criteria, including "immediate threat to fundamental human 
rights, particularly a threat of widespread loss of human life." Other values would include 
42The resolution stated, in put, that the Seauity Council: 
1. Condemns the repression of the Iraqi civilian population in many parts of Iraq, including rnoa recently in 
Kurdish populated areas, the consequences of which thratcn international peace and securiry in the rcgion; 
2. Demands that Iraq, as a contribution to remove the & r a t  to inrernarional pace and security in the region, 
immcdiarcly end this repression and express the hope in rhc same fontat  h a t  m open dlalogue will uke plau to 
ensure chat the human and polirid rights of all Iraqi citizens 
are rcspccccd; 
3. Insists that fnq allow immcdiitc access by international humanitarian organizations to all those in need of 
assisancc in all parts of Iraq and tu make available all neceuvy facilities for their operations; 
4. Rqucsts the Secretary-General to pursue his humanitarian efforts in Iraq and to repart forthwith, if 
appropriate on the basis of a furrhcr mission to the region, on the plight of the Inpi civilian population, and in 
particular the W i s h  population, suffering fmm the repression in all itr forms inflicted by the Iraqi authorities; 
5. Requests further the Secrenry-General to use all the I*SOUK~P at his disposal, including rhose of the relevant 
United Nations agencies, to address urgcntly the critical naedr of the rdugea and displaced Iraqi population; 
6. Appeals to all Member Sutes and to all humanitarian organizations to contribute K, these humanitarian 
relief dforts.... 
43payun Akhavan, 'Lessons from Iraqi Kurdistan: Self-dcrerrnination and Humanitarian Intervention against 
Genocide,' Nd* Q u a d y  ofHummc Rigb~,  l 1  (1 1993): 49. 
Lillich, p. 85. 
proportionaliry and the use of the minimum amount of force, and sensitivity to the relationship 
between the values being upheld and the force used. At the same time, self-determination must 
not be undercut.45 
Ellen Frey-Wouters takes a slightly different position. Acknowledging that unilateral 
action is not permissible, she "admit[s] that forceful 'unilateral intervention may have to be 
practiced in certain unique and extremely genocidal situations, but international law need nor 
aurhorize or encourage it."46 In essence, this is a call for international civil disobedience, which, 
presumably, would be recognized as being "right," even if not legal. She goes on to say that 
"forceful unilateral action however humanitarian in intent, cannor be condoned as legal, even when 
acting in lieu of the duly established mechanism, lest the abuse of that unilateralism destroy the 
whole basis for legally constituted proccss."47 
The arguments against unilateral intervention are compelling. The inability of states to act 
out of purely humanitarian motives is well established. But if humanitarian objectives are achieved 
does this matter? If states wiIl not acr unless they have an interest in the situation -- ideological, 
political, strategic, economic -- should they be given an excuse to pursue these motives? The last 
thing the world needs are self-appointed police who decide, as much as on state interests as 
humanitarian interests, when to intervene in other states. Throughout history, the self-appointed 
police have shown themselves to be singularly incapable of not abusing their position, and there is 
no prospect for this changing in the future. Without a legal prohibition, states might feel even 
more free than they do now to engage in intervention. In addition, the principle of reciprocity 
should be brought into the equation. Certainly, the great powers would not want other states 
intervening in their affdirs. Yet, one might conjure up instances where, while not genocidal within 
the state, might have similar consequences. For example, the United States has vast stores of 
grain, produced as a result of protectionist policies, which sit for y e m  and ultimately are wasted. 
451n Lillich, pp. 49-50. 
Lillich, p. 107. 
Qlbid., p. 100. 
in light of the fact that there are millions dying around the world because of a lack of food, it 
would seem reasonable that the states in which these people are starving would have a certain 
iustihcation for using forceful means to acquire this grain.4g Yet, even though mass suffering -- 
possibly on the scale of genocidal regimes which might be intervened in -- could be alleviated with 
this grain, it is doubtful that this daim wouId be recognized by many states, and certainly nor by 
the states with grain. 
Finally, R.J. Vincent puts forth three reasons why the doctrine of nonintervention should 
be upheld: 1) there is no guarantee of imputialig, 2) the action might be unwelcome because it 
comes from outside, and 3) there is no common moralicy which transcends borders from which 
sne could derive principles of intervention.49 The first has already been dealt wirh. The second 
reason is especially pertinent to former colonies and other states who have had a history of foreign 
intervention of one type or another.50 Of course, this is not restricted to these states; indeed, a 
people wirh a healthy dose of nationalism, or just a keling that it is up to them to determine their 
Dwn destiny, might see such an action in this light. The third reason, to a large extent, is true, 
dthough one could make the case that the prohibition against genocide, in its position as jrrr 
cogms, wodd qualify as a transcendent moral principle, as would other human rights principles. In 
addition, below I will h h e r  discuss other ways to derive a compelling interest in humanitarian 
iituations, as well as a nght, and possibIy even a duty, to intervene on the pm of cemain typcs of 
international organizations. Even if there were a common moral framework, as has already been 
iiscussed, states do not, in general, act for moral reasons.5' Thus, it would seem that unilateral 
humanitarian intervention is illegitimate, and probably should continue to be so. 
48111 hct. they wodd have a better claim rhm rates, such as the US, which use or rhreaten ro use force to ensure the 
3ow of oil or other 'saregic" minerals to their shores. 
4% J. Vinccnt, Noninermuinn nndlntmrrrtionnl Order, (Princeton: Princecon University Pms. 1974): 345. 
5°1nterestingly enough, this parricular mndition doer nor seem to obtain in the recent US invasion of  Panmz. An 
,venvhelming majority of the population xcms to have supprtcd the US action. What the facling would have been if 
:hc invasion hzd not ben as immediardy successful - in terms of  getting Noricg our of power - and if more lives had 
m n  last may be a different question. Indeed, as the US backed away from its proclaimed rcsponsibiliry to provide a 
n k v e  influx of  i d ,  opinion began turning againsr the US somewhat. 
5'0fcourse. states frequently have a moralistic fbreign policy with which they try to impose a certain moral oudook 
,n other sntes, such as the superiority of capialism over socialism. But this just Further demonstrates the lack of  
,rmscmdent morality recognized within the Fnmcwork of  fotcign policy. 
Regional and Global Humanitarian Intervention 
Accepting the assumption that unilateral action is not legitimate, this leaves two other 
options -- regional and global action. Regional humanitarian intervention would include action by 
organizations such as the Organization of American States (OAS) or the Organization of Ai%ican 
Unity (OAU), and the global organization would, of course, be the UN. Thcse two options will 
be discussed below. 
The WN Charter, as well as much subsquent action by the UN, while reaffirming the 
basic principle of nonintervention, also affirms the prorection of human rights as a goal. While 
some may argue whether or not the protection of human rights is put in a primary or secondary 
position in the Charter with regard to intervention, it is nonetheless recognized as something 
within the UN's competence. FaIk observes: "The renunciation of [unilateral] intervention does 
not substitute a policy of nonintervention; it involves the development of some form of collective 
intervention."52 While establishing the legality of UN action above, a few of the problems 
surrounding such action were mentioned. The most basic problem is that the UN, through the 
Securiry Council, has not chosen, or been able, to act. Most conflicts and situations where there 
have been gross violations of human rights have, until recently, been viewed by the superpowers 
through the lens of Cold War rivalry, which has made it virtually impossible to get them to agree, 
as they must along wich the other permanent members, to any kind of action. There have been, of 
course, peacekeeping operations which, while filling somewhat outside of the what the Charter 
originally envisioned, have been useful in cooling down conflicts. However, this is not the kind of 
action that might ultimately be needed. 
Richard Falk d l s  for UN legislative intervention which he sees as the lesser of evils:53 'The 
advantage of overcoming colonialism or racism by world community standards, rather than by 
protracted civil war, commend the adoption of a more radical approach to legislative intervention 
by the United Nations."5* Yet, the UN did not take action during the genocidal reign of the 
Khmer Rouge in Cambodia, or, as already pointed our, in Bangladesh or Uganda. Falk points 
out, howwer, that there was consensus fbr the peacekeeping action in the Congo in 19G0, as well 
as for the UN censure of Portugal's administration of Angola,55 and there was consensus on the 
issue of apartheid in South Africa, although no real action was taken by the UN to bring about the 
end of the qparthcid regime. Back in 1964, Falk was hopeful on the possibilities for UN consensus 
and action: "In general, world community policies in these areas [of human rights] are atready 
giving precedence over traditional deferences to national sovcrcignty."5~ This hopefulness has not 
been fully realized by any means. Yet, there are a few positive signs thirty years later. The 
superpower conflict has receded, and there has been renewed interest in, and reliance on, the 
United Nations. There has also been more great power, and general international, cooperation in 
attempting to resolve conflicts, such as in Angola, Namibia, and Cambodia. There has also been a 
renewed interest in human rights. Unfortunately, this has coincided with what appear to be 
increasing human rights problems, induding famine, brutal regimes, refugees, and other grave 
humanitarian situations. 
Even with hopeful signs, can UN action, being the result of one big power play, be seen as 
more legitimate than unilateral action? The UN, and particularly the Security Council, is a 
reflection of state interests -- especially those of powerful states -- and at rimes has been pardyzcd 
by these interests. This has changed somewhat in recent years, but the UN has not come 
anywhere near being an autonomous actor above state intercst, and thus these intercsts will come 
into play whenever a response to a humanitarian situation is contemplated. Yet, the UN can 
come doser to expressing universal ourrage at human rights abuses than any other body. Given 
rhe extreme difficulty which the UN has had in the past in engaging in any kind of collective 
action, it is unlikely that the ability to intervene will be abused in the future.57 And, there have 
%Ibid. pp. 57-58. 
551bid., pp. 51, $4. 
%bid. p. 51. 
s7~owevcr, one could argue that theway the United Snrcs and wirh respect ro rhe UN in obtaining its blessing In 
prosecuting the Gulf War was m a b w  of Be system. 
been instances where the UN has recently taken some concrete action in humanitarian situations. 
In fact, recent events have moved one observer to remark: "The rapidity of change and the scope 
of these new collective efforts have turned on its head the long-standing question of whether the 
UN could do anything useful; today, the question is whether the UN can do n,ything."58 
UN responses have been selective and will continue to be so. T o  a large degree, the 
response to a crisis has depended upon the interest and wdl of one or more grcat powers, 
and this is likely to continue. However, this selectivity does not necessarily delegitimate all UN 
humanitarian incerventions. Even though there may be certain instances where action will not be 
taken to respond to a humanirarian crisis, the world may be in for a period of time where it must 
take what it can get. That is, while situations like the Sudan may be ignored by the international 
community, and the response to Somalia was belated, this does not mean that we should not 
accept that which can be done -- including a rather late intervention in Somalia -- while at the 
same time trying to make international reactions more uniform and speedy. 
Several recent instances of UN involvement demonstrate the still tentative and ambiguous 
nature of forceful UN action. The first is Security Council resolution 688 and the actions taken to 
protect the Kurds in Northern Iraq &er the Gulf War. Resolution 688 "insist[ed] that Iraq allow 
immediate access by international humanitarian organizations to all those in need of assistance in 
all parts of Iraq ...." The actual legitimacy of this resolution was vigorously debated. On the one 
hand, France argued that massive human rights abuses, even if not accompanied by threars to 
international security, were worthy of intervention by the Security Council, which "'would have 
been remiss in its task had it stood idly by, without reacting to the massacre of entire populations, 
the extermination of civilians, induding women and children.'"59 China, on the other hand, 
which abstained on the vote for 688, made reference to the "domestic jurisdiction" clause in 
Article 2 (7). Further, the resolution made it clear that it was not violations of human rights but 
~8~astor,  p. 134. (italics in original) 
59~rcnch r c p r ~ n a t i v c  to rhc UN Security Council, quoted in Akhavon, p. 44. 
the consequences of those violations -- refugees as threats to peace and securiry -- which provided 
the basis for Security Council action.60 
The United Kingdom, France. and the Unitcd States declared, first, a "no-fly zone" in 
Northern Iraq (as well as in Southern Iraq where the Shi'ite population was threatened), and 
second, a plan to create Kurdish enclaves, protected from the Iraqi military, and introduced forces 
to carry out this plan. These countries relied on resolution 688 to legitimize their actions. Yet, 
resolution 688 did not specifidly authorize this use of force, and the Secretary-General did not 
request it, although he did, in the end, acquiesce in the intervention.6' Thus, while the Allied 
powers were engaging in activity which responded to the pirit of resolution 688, it did not carry 
out its activities with respea to the Irttcr of the resolution. 
This activity was, dearly, a violation of Iraqi sovereignty. This led to a curious situation 
where those who, just months earlier, took forceful action to uphold the sanctity of state 
sovereignty, were undermining that same c0nce~t.62 Further, these actions demonstwtc an 
increased willingness, on the part of at least some of the more powerful state actors on the 
international scene, to take forceful action on behalf of human rights which has the effect of 
undermining sovereign authority.6f 
In Somalia, the Security Council approved a plan by the United States to provide a 
substantial number a troops to restore order and ensure that humanitarian aid could get to where 
it was needed. In the months Following the intervention, the country was wradted by much less 
violence and the threat of starvation receded dramatically. The UN subsequendy took over the 
operations from US forces. 
@&van, p. 44. The preamble to resolution 688 made reference to 'the repression of the Inqi civilian population 
in many p m  of [mq, including most recently in Kurdish populated a rm,  which led to a masivc flow of refugees 
towards and across inarzciond frontiers and to cross-border incursions, which threaten international pace and security 
in the rcgion ...." 
61~oward Melman. 'Hurnaniarian Intmmtion: The C* of the Kurds." I ~ l u r l J o r m r r I u f R ~ g r c  Law, 4 
(1 1992): 19-21; Akhavm, pp. 4 5 .  
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630f  coursz given the rhetorical (and, one could argue, military) cxccsscs which the Unitcd States, especially. 
d i r d  at the Inqi regime, and given the initial relucnnce to be involved in the humaniariin mission, one could also 
argue that this was just a situation where the US was just raking advantage of an opportunity to undermine its sworn 
cncmy. 
The case of Somalia is unique because there was no sovereign authority within Somalia 
which would be the focal point of either negotiations or intervention. Second, there was an 
obvious "threat to the peacen as a result of the massive flows of refugees fleeing the fighting. This 
means that while there is an indirect connection between human rights and UN action, the main 
rationale for action was still the traditional threat to the pcace, although the conce$ion of this 
threat has changed. Yet, the instance of Somalia also indicates, perhaps. the gtimmerings of 
change in the reasons for a major actor on the international scene -- namely the United States -- to 
become involved in forceful action. In Somalia, there were no direct economic or strategic 
interests of the US64 -- as opposed to the situation in Iraq -- which were threatened by the 
continued instability and starvation, the bases on which the US has traditionally acted. Thus, the 
United States -- after, it must be pointed out, a significant period of delay and soul-searching -- 
committed troops to what, at least from the US perspective, must been seen as an essentially 
humanitarian mission. The fact chat the US pulled out after the US public finally realized the 
potential costs of such a commitment only partidly takes away from a dramatic change in policy. 
Mention must also be made of UN action, or inaction, in the former Y~~oslavia.65 The 
'ethnic cleansing" which has been carried out against Muslims in Bosnia-Herzegovina surely 
qualifies as genocide, Yet, the response has been generally muted. Several thousand UN 
peacekeepers were put on the ground to protea aid convoys; yet, the peacekeepers have had a very 
circumscribed mandate with regard to the use of force. This has meant that commanders on the 
%Iowever, some have argued that domestic political factors within the United Stares played a significant role in the 
timing, as well as the actual fin, of the intervention. Certainly, there was a long period of time before the intcrvcncion 
during which the US could have acted and did not. One might also point to the "CNN Factor." That is, to many it 
appears t b t  the United Sates and ;he rest of the world may only respond to humanitarian emergencies when the world 
media focus on a prdcular situation, showing graphic pictures on the evening news, thus lading to domestic pressure to 
'do something." If this is so, then humanitvian responses will continue to be highly sekrive. Howwa, it may also 
paint to a situation where domatic pressure is felt on the international scene. Further, it may also force a partid 
r aoncepd iu r ion  of thc way 'rate" action actually occurs. That is, rather than just focusing analysis on how the apex of 
power in a particular m n m y  - presidents, prime minicten, etc. - racts to a given humanitarian disaster, it may also be 
important to indude the role of the media and publics as crucial determinants of foreign policy. T o  the extent that 
Prcridcnt Bush felt prermre to intervene in a sinurion where rherc were no 'viral smtegic intaesu,' this should be seen at 
kast partly as m exercise in popular rovereignry, and the subsequent action as an expression of the will of the country as a 
whole. 
6 5 ~ 0 r  an in-depth discussion of rhc situation in the former Yugoslavia sec Jarnes B. Steinbtrg, 'Yugoslavia," in Lori 
Fislcr Damrosch, cd., Enfircing Reswaint: GlIrctiw l e m o n  an I n t d  Con@, (New York: Council on Foreign 
Relations, 1993): 27-76. 
ground have had to rely almost entirely on negotiations to get aid through to where it i s  needed, 
frequently resulting in delays of weeks or months. The UN and NATO have periodically made 
bold statements regarding the need to use force to ensure that aid can get through to where it is 
needed and, in a couple of instances, to end the Serbian siege of a couple of Muslim enclaves, 
including Sarejevo. Howwer, even in the face of demonstrated genocide, hundreds of thousands 
dead, and two million refugees, the international community generdly hiled to take Corcehl 
action to address the situation. The only exceptions to this have been a few instances where 
NATO forces have bornbcd Serbian forces which have violated the so called "safe zonesn around 
the enclaves, which turned out not to be very safe at all. Yet, until the spring and summer of 1995 
-- more than three years after the genocide became apparent to the world community -- these 
were very limited and did not result in significant improvements in the situation.u Only then did 
NATO expand it's air strikes, to such a degree that, along with Bosnian gains on the gound, the 
Serbs tinally negotiated an end to the war.67 In addition, the UN imposed sanctions on Serbia for 
its support of the Bosnian Serbs. The very late use of Force seemed to have changed the tide of the 
conflict. This demonstratts that the course of the entire conflict may have changed dramatically 
if hrce had been used three ymrs earlier. 
Those supporting UN involvement in the conflict used three intertwined justifications for 
that involvement. These arc rhat the refugcc situation, the humanitarian situation resulting born 
h e  war, and the h u m  rights violations perpetrated by the Bosnian Serbs threaten internationd 
pace  and security. Certainly, the hundreds of thousands of refugees impacted neighboring 
states, as did the prospect of the conflict spreading to more states. Here, again, is an instance 
where humanitarian con- arc perceived as being important and within the mandate of the UN 
Security Council. At the same time, however, this is also another case where these concerns have 
been brccd into the rubric of "intcrnationd peace and securityn rather than standing on their own 
6 6 ' ~ . ~ .  Bombs Bosnian Serbs," 77~eAuociaPdPnrr [Online]. (April 10, 1994), Available: USENET Newsgroup: 
clui.news.fighting. 
6 7 ' ~ ~ ~ ~  Srrikcr At Serb Base," T h  Associand htrr [Online), (May 26, 1995), Available: USENET Newsgroup: 
clari.world.organizations; 'Chronology of Conflict in  Former Yugoslavia," Reutcrr [Online], (October 5,  1995). 
Available: USENET Newsgroup: dari.world.organiurions. 
as justifications for UN action. The human rights situation, by itself, did seem to provide the 
necessary justification for involvement by the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe 
(CSCE), as evidenced in the Moscow Declaration of October 1991. However, it took many 
months just to get human rights monitors into Serbian areas, albeit without Serbian consent.68 
The internationd reaction to the Rwandan genocide of up to one million people was a 
significant failure. The UN had knowledge that a p o c i d e  was being planned, but this 
infbrmation seems to have gotten lost in the burcaucracy.~9 Once the genocide began in the wake 
of the assassination of the Rwandan and Burundian presidents on Aprii G, 1994, the international 
community took litde action. In fact, most of the 2.500 peacekeeping troops in Rwanda as part 
I of the 1993 Arusha peace accords were withdrawn. On May 17 that the Security Council 
expanded the United Nations Mission in Rwanda (UNAMIR) to 5,500 troops, but they were not 
deployed at the It was not until the French, acting under a Chapter VII mandate, 
intervened in one parr of the country in June that any forceful action was taken to stop the 
genocide or protect potential victims. It was a limited intervention and was tied up with French 
interests in Rwanda?' but it is credited with possibly saving 12,000-14,000 lives (mostly Hutu, 
with whom F m c e  had connections). Beyond this, the international community took no forceful 
action to stop the genocide. 
Another recent case is that of Haiti. After the first elected President, Jean Benrand 
Atistide, was owrthrown in a coup on September 30, 1991, the UN took little action. However, it 
did impose mandatory sanctions, including an oil embargo, on Haiti in June 1993. Sccuriry 
Council Resolution 841, which imposed the sanctions, made reference, yet again, to threats to 
Stcinberg in Damrosch. ed., pp. 52-5. 
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international peace and security, as evidenced in the refugee siruacion. It also took into account 
the wishes of the recognized g ~ v e r n m e n t . ~ ~  However, Damrosch maintains that Resolution 841's 
most important aspea was that 
the Haitian sanctions resolution goes firther than any other to date in applying universal, 
mandatory, and severe economic sanctions to influence a domestic political crisis over 
democratic governance. Its cautious wording (stressing more than once the "unique and 
exceptional" circumstances) cannot hide its precedential significance.73 
The sanctions were partially suspended in August 1993 when it seemed that the coup leaders were 
imptementing the Governor's Island agreement which was to restore Aristide to power. They 
were reinstated two monchs later afier it became obvious that the de facto authorities were not 
implemenring the agreement in good faith.T4 
After this time, the pressures for international action continued to mount, most 
dramatically with the waves of refugees fleeing Haiti. On July 31, 1994 at the urging of the 
United States, the UN Security Council passed Resolution 940 by a 12-0 vote which authorized 
member states to 'use all necessary means" to return Aristide to power. The US heightened its 
rhetoric regarding its will to intervene over the ensuing month and a half and US military ships 
were moved into position oRof Haiti. Findly, a settlement was reached with US representatives 
after the military leadership found out that a US invasion force was on its way and paratroopers 
would land in a few hours. Aristide returned to Haiti on October 15, 1994. 
Haiti, on the one hand, represents a significant shift in international practice with regard to 
forceful action for humanitarian ends, and on the other, also demonstrates the continuing 
ambiguities as the internationd community attempts to come to agreement on when and how to 
intemene in humanitarian situations. Regarding the first, this was the first time that the Security 
Council authorized the use of force to reinstall a democntidly elected leader ousted in a coup. 
There have been many other instances where the UN has taken linle or no action. The motives of 
the United States, which pushed for and carried out the intervention, were mixed, but were also 
72hri  Fislet Darnrowh, 'Epilogue," in Damrosch, ed., pp. 375. 
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different than in other instances of US intervention. Certainly foremost on the minds of US 
leaders was the continued flow of refugees from Haiti, mosr of whom were trying to get to the 
United States. However, this demonstrates the ways in which humanitarian crises can become 
international, leading to action against a government in power. The threat, rather than the actual 
use, of force was used by the international community to violate the sovereignty of a state which 
fit all of the traditional conditions of statehood. That the defacto government of Lieut. Gen. 
Raoul Gdras was not, however, recognized by the internationd community, sets a precedent that 
human rights matter when determining the legitimacy of a government. 
The ambiguities associated with this insrancc are threefold. First is the amount of time it 
took for the international community to react. It was two years before the UN took its first 
decisive actions, and it was only after the mandatory sanctions were in place that CMras began 
taking the UN or OAS seriously.75 And, it took another year fbr the Security Council to 
authorize the measures which ultimately proved necessary to restore Aristide to power. Second, 
although the UN Security Council authorized the actions the US ultimately took, and threatened 
to take, it was a completely US operation. The UN representative was not even notified before 
the US launched its ultimately aborted invasion. This points to the ha that the UN still does not 
have the necessary resources and procedures in place to deal with this kind of situation. Third, the 
basis for Resolution 841 was, again, a threat to "international peace and security in the region." 
While, in one sense, this illustrates yet again an expanding view of what kinds of situations the UN 
can and should be involved in, it also represents the continuing attempt to fit new situations into 
old categories. That is, as long as the Security Council does not make the basis of its actions 
humanituian, there will still be uncertainty and ambiguiry regarding exactly when it can act. 
While recent actions are a positive sign with respect to humanitarian action, this concern, along 
with the long time periods in which ir has acted and the unevenness of its actions, still leaves 
significant doubt and ambiguity regarding the course of UN action. 
There is thus a mixed record with respect to forceful aaion on the part of the UN to deaI 
with dire humanitarian emergencies. Such action has been cast in terms of responding to threats 
to the peace, enabling the international community to finesse the question of sovereignty. 
However, as noted at the beginning of the article, using this as the basis for action, first, can lead 
to a situation where the concept of a threat to the peace is expanded to such an extent that it is 
rendered meaningless. Second, waiting for a situation to wolve to a situation which might be 
considered to have dire international consequences under traditional meanings of a threat to the 
peace may lead to a worsening of the humanitarian situation. Thus, more thought should be given 
to legitimating forceful humanitarian action more directly through evoIving notions of the 
relationship between sovereignty and human rights. 
Given that the UN can intervene, a d  given that some instances where a police action 
might be needed immediately to prevent or stop massive violations of human rights, whereas even 
in the best of drcumstanccs the UN does not act quickly, how can such aaion be taken in a timely 
matter? One possibility might be to create a standing rapid reaction capability b r  the UN, 
comprised of troops earmarked by governments which would be ready on a moment's notice to 
be deployed in the event of a humanitarian emergency. One such proposal has recently been put 
forth by the Canadian Government.76 In addition to expediting the deployment of UN forces, it 
might also a a  a deterrent. However, there is still the problem of getting the Security Council to 
act in the first place. In addition, such a force might not act as a deterrent until it had been used 
in a couple of instances and the international community had actually demonstrated its will to use 
it in situations ~Fhumanirarian need. 
A number of observers would prefer regional collective action over UN action. A major 
premise is that humanitarian intervention should be the result of an expression of community 
standards. A regional organization may, in some instmm, be able to have a more true expression 
of community than a global organization. John Moore lays out three reasons for preferring 
76lbwirds a Rapid -on Capability for rhe Unired Nations," Governmenr of Canada. Department of Foreign 
Affiirs and lnrernarional Trade, [Online], (September 1995), Available: World Wide Web Path: hrrp:llwww.dfait- 
ma~i.gc.alenglirhlnewrlnewrIetr/unlrap 1 .htm. 
regional action.77 First, it might be more effective. There may be greater expertise on local issues 
within the regional organization.78 In addition, it may be easier ro ger such action without having 
to deal with the veto in the Security Council or some political block in the UN. Second, it may 
have a better chance of keeping out great power involvement, which might otherwise distort or 
attempt to control the action for national ends. Third, the parties to a dispute might prefer a 
regional forum. Of course, a dictator who might be overthrown by such an action would prefer 
no aaion at all, but the other states in the region who will also be affected in one way or another 
by any kind of intervention might view action which they have a greater hand in implementing 
more fivorably than UN action. 
There are many problems associated with regional action, many of which are the same as 
in the case of the UN. The main problem is that regional organizations have b e n  as rcluccant as 
the UN to act. For example, they did not act in any kind of decisive way in the cases of Uganda, 
Bangladesh, and Cambodia. Ambassador Akwei from Ghana, talking about the OAU during the 
UN debate regarding the Bangladesh intervention, stated: 
The Organization of African Unity knows that once intervention in the a i r s  of a 
Members State is permitted, once one permits oneself the higher wisdom of telling 
another Member State what it should do with regard to arranging its own political f i r s ,  
one opens a Pandora's box. And no continent can su&r more than Africa when such a 
principle [of nonintervention] is thwarced.79 
While, as has been shown, atrocities such as genocide cannot be regarded internal political &rs, 
Akwei expresses legitimate concerns coming from a history of hundreds of years of colonial 
domination and interference in Africa. The same attitude would apply to Latin America, where, 
for several hundred years at the mercy of the European powers, it is now still perceived by the 
dominant power in the region -- the US -- as its backyard. Thapa, too, does not see humanitarian 
intervention on the part of the OAU as a real possibility: 
n l n  Lillich, p. 100. 
T8~or  example, there has been much debate since rhc beginning of thc Somalian operation about the namre of 
Somdian society, especially with rcspecr to whether its social structures can or cannot be fit within rmdirional Western 
conceptions of  social and policial organiurion, which might have consequences for how negoriadons and other acriviries 
should be undeden .  The OAU might be more xnsirive ro t h e  issues. 
79Quoted in Buyler, p. 614, nore 320. 
the African Organization, a loose association of African states, lacks among its members a 
coherence of aims and principles, so that it has proven of little use in the handling of 
regional problems. Particularly, inhumane treatment, unless at the hands of white rulers, 
does not come among its list of immediate concerns; which casts doubt as to whether any 
collective action of the Mrican organizarion for [humanitarian inrervention] purposes 
would be forthcoming if the necessity arose.80 
While concerns might be justified, at the same time this cannot be used as a shield by states to 
prevent legitimate action by of the international community on behalf of human rights. 
More generally, one can point to other impediments to regional action. First, most 
regional organizations do not have the institutional capacity to take effective action. The one 
exception to this -- NATO -- has shown itsdf to be extremely reluctant to act in cases where it 
might, particularly in the former Yugoslavia. In addition, frequently regional organizations may 
have a particular stake in a conflict, or one or more of the main members of an organization may 
also be parties to a conflict or other humanitarian emergency. Further, the members of an 
organization may be so deeply divided as ro preclude agreement on a course of action. Finally, 
leaders may be rductant to approve of any action which could provide a precedent which migh t 
by used against them in the future.81 
However, a few recent oramplcs illustrate at least a partial shifi on the part of some of the 
governments in these regions. First, a number of Latin American countries did support forceful 
action to return Aristide to power. These included Argentina and the thirteen member Caribbean 
Community, several of whom offered a token contribution to the US force. Many of the larger 
Latin American countries did not support an invasion -- Brazil and Venezuela abstained on 
Rrsolution 940 -- but did support the outcome of rhe threatened action.82 Although support for 
80Quotcd in Bazyia, p. 614, nore 320. 
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an invasion was by no means unanimous, the very fact rhat some Latin American countries did 
express support for intervention signals a dramatic shift away from the previous total 
nonintervention stance. One observer secs this as part of a precedent for greater support for 
humanitarian intervention which could have &-reaching consequences: 
But a precedent is being created that could well rescue some future democratic 
government in Nicaragua or Trinidad or even Paraguay from the hands of its own soldiers 
-- and, more importantly, will deter the soldiers from seizing power in many mote 
countries. It is not just an American initiative, and ic is not just business as usual.83 
Second, in the case of Rwanda, the head of the OAU supported a UN force -- as opposed to an 
African force -- to help restore order and end the genocidal killings.84 
A third example is the intervention in Liberia by the Economic Community of West 
African States (ECOWAS). In Liberia, a civil war begun at the cnd of 1989 plunged the country 
into total chaos, resulting in near genocide, refugees, and very clear threats to international peace 
and security as a result of the refugees flows as well as the spread of fighting to neighboring states. 
Even though called on by many Liberians to do so, the United States did not intervene, seeing no 
strategic interest and claiming that it was an African problem, to be solved by Africans. The UN 
Security Council, too, Wed to take action. Indeed, the two African states serving on the Security 
Council at the time rejected Security Council involvement, not wanting to set a preccdent.85 
About eight months after the civil war began, ECOWAS established the ECOWAS Cease-fire 
Monitoring Group (ECOMOG). Although it was supposedly for monitoring a cease-fire, it 
dearly had to impose a cease-fire first. While it has been pmially successful, including imposing a 
two year cease-fire, fighting has continued, and at times, ECOMOG has found itself taking sides 
against one of the parties to the conflict, a group headed by Charles Taylor, a former Liberian 
official who was in exile, and whose fbrcer began the civil war.86 
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The international reaction to the ECOWAS intervention, and the grounds put forth for 
the intervention, both demonstrate a gradual shift in thinking regarding intervention. As 
Wippman points out, "[fjrom the outset, the international community's response to the 
ECOWAS intervention in Liberia ha been, for the most p m ,  one of guvded appr0val."~7 M a y  
states and international organizations, such as the OAU, Europcan Community, and the Security 
Council supported ECOWAS' various initiatives with respect to the civil w u ,  and the Security 
Council passed Resolution 788, imposing an arms embargo on Liberia. The general response to 
the actual intervention has b e n  very muted, with little condemnation, and ECOMOG has been 
generally supported by the people within Liberia. The main basis put forth for the intervention 
was humanitarian, including ending the "'massacre of innocent civilians,'" and this was generally 
accepted by the international community, at least by aquicscence. In h, the OAU. Security 
Council, and European Community all supported the humanitxian outcomes of the intervention 
while at the same time downplaying the fact that force was used.88 Perhaps one of the most 
significvlt statements cante from the Secretary-Genenl of the OAU, Salim A Salim: 
for an African government to have the right to kill its citizens or let its citizens be killed, 1 
believe there is no clause in the marter [of the OAU] that allows this. 
T o  tell the truth, the charter was created to preserve the humanity, dignity, and the 
rights of the Afiican. You cannot use a clause of che charter to oppress the African and say 
that you are implementing the OAU charter. What has happened is that people have 
interpreted rhe charter as if to mean that what happens in the next house is not one's 
concern. This does not accord with the reality of the world.*9 
A few other African leaders supported this view, although most probably would not. However, 
the fict that the head of the OAU would make a statement like that and that these views would 
be considered legitimate for debate demonstrates change in thinking about what sovereignry 
entails and what kind of intervention may be legitimate. 
Both the United Nations and regional organizations have been reluctant to act in a variety 
of situations, and have demonstrated ambiguity in when and on what basis any type of 
871Kd., p. 175. 
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humanitarian intervention should occur. Yet, both have acted forcefully in a few situations of 
humanitarian cries, if somewhat belatedly. This will probably continue to be the case for the near 
future as the international community struggles to resolve the serious questions raised by such 
humanitarian emergencies and examines how they relate to both traditional concepts of 
international peace and security and traditional concepts of sovereignty. Further, in some 
situations the UN may be in a better position to act. It has more resources and more of a 
background in conducting many different types of operations, and. with the somewhat hopeful 
signs mentioned above, might have a greater propensity to seriously consider human rights as a 
basis for action. Yet, the UN might also authorize a regional organization to actually carry out 
any actions. In Bosnia-Herzegovina, the UN essentially authorized NATO to carry out certain 
forceful activities within the context of a mandate from the UN, as was in the case with the US in 
Haiti. 
Humvlitvian Access 
At the beginning of this paper 1 made a distinction between humanitarian access and 
humanitarian intervention. Hurnanitvian intervention is premised, for the most pm,  on the use 
of force for humanitarian ends, and may have as its eventual outcome the removal of a repressive 
regime. Humanitarian access, on the other hand, does not necessarily entail the use of force and is 
focused on meliorating the immediate humanitarian situation, not the broader political and 
military aspects. In addition, it has as its focus the rights of individuals, developed to the greatest 
extent in times of war, to receive humanitarian assistance, and the rights and duties of the 
international community to provide it. In addition, a much wider array of actors is involved in 
gaining and maintaining access than is the case in intervention. 
The problems and questions posed with respect to humanitarian access urd sovereignty are 
numerous. First, to what extent has the recognition of a right evolved such that access may no 
longer be considered a violation of sovereignty? Second, to what extent is here a duv as opposed 
to a right on the part of the international community to provide humanitarian assistance and 
ensure that humanitarian access for a wide array of humanitarian organizations is maintained? 
Third, since the focus of international law and the sovereignty discourse has been states, can 
NGOs which have little to no international personality actually violate sovereignty when they 
provide unauthorized humanitarian aid? 
Recent years have provided a number of instances where humanitarian access has been 
needed and has been gained, with or without the permission of the state. Sometimes such actions 
I have been pur in terms of challenges to state sovereignty. In other cases, the question of 
sovereignty has not been directly raised, although one might interpret the actions as undermining 
sovereignty nonetheless. These have included declarations by the General Assembly and 
~ 
independent actions by humanitarian NGOs. In addition, the Geneva Conventions and Protocols 
have provided an important basis for action by the International Committee of the Red Cross 
I (ICRC) and other organizations. 
The main body of law on which the ICRC and others base their activities and their daim 
that there is a right to assistance is the 1949 Geneva Conventions and the rwo Additional 
Protocols of 1977. The original conventions related solely to international armed conflict, 
whereas Protocol 11 broadened the realm of action somewhat to included non-international vmed 
conflict. h i d e  59 of the Fourth Geneva Convention provides for a right on the part of civilians 
to receive humanitarian assistance during wa~irne.9~ Under h i d e  9 common to the First, 
Second, and Third Geneva Conventions, and Artidc 81 of Additional Protocol I, the ICRC has 
the right of initiative during international armed conflicts. In addition, Article 3 of the four 
Geneva Conventions provides for that same Light. This means that the ICRC (and other 
humanitarian organizations) can offer humanitarian assistance to those in need during 
Further, according to Artide 70 of Protocol I such offers, made impartially, should not be 
9O~rrhur C. Heiton, "The Legality of Providing Humanitarian Assistance Without the Cansent of the Sovcrcign." 
I ~ t i d J r n ~ m u f o f ~ g c ~  h, 4 (3 1992): 375. 
9lDenise Planner, uAssisance to rhc Civilian Population: The Dcvelopmenr and Present Sratc of International 
Humanitarian Law," Inrman'omd Reuicw of rhc Red Cro$s, (May-June 1992): 251; Maurice Torrelli, 'Ftom 
Humaniailvr Assircanct to ' l ~ c m n r i o n  on Humanitarian Gm&? I n m t i o n a l  Review oftbe Red CTDS. (May-June 
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considered an unfriendly a ~ t ; 9 ~  that is, it is not a threat to the sovereignty of the state to which 
such assistance is offered. k one observer has put it: "As this right of initiative has been legally 
accepted by States, it cannot be denounced as undue interference when exercised. By recognizing 
this right, States have simply expressed their so~ereignty."~3 However, if it can be thought of as 
an act of sovereignty, then perhaps it is an act within a broadened concept of sovereignty which 
includes more responsibilities with respect to humanitarian issues and human rights. 
Regarding internal conflict, h i d e  18 of Protocol I1 reads: 
If the civilian population is suffering undue hardship owing to a lack of the supplies 
essential for its survival, such as foodstuffj m d  medical supplies, relief actions for the 
civilian population which are of an exclusively humanitarian and impartial nature and 
which are conducted without any adverse distinction shall be undertaken subjcct to the 
consent of the High Contracting Parry concerned. 
While this provides for consent, as Denise Plattner points out, "when correctly interpreted, it 
means that such agreement must be given if the necessary conditions are fulfilled Iirnpartiality and 
neutrality], and for as long as the relief operation is taking place on the territory controlled by the 
legal government.n94 Or, as she maintains with respect to Artide 70 of Protocol I: "Thc 
agreement of the State is needed, but this is in no way a matter of discretion ...."ss Further, 
Arcides 54 of Protocol I and 14 of Protocol It outlaw attempts to starve a civilian population.96 
Thus, a right to receive humanitarian assistance exists.97 and the ICRC and other 
orgatkitions have a right to o&r such assistance. And, the state in question has an obligation to 
accept such offers of humanitarian assistance. Even if a state does not provide consent, perhaps 
maintaining thar an armed conflict, as such, was not occurring, Michael Bothe has argued that the 
9 2 ~ h m e r  92, p. 261. 
ff%orrdli, p. 232. 
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ICRC can lawfully act unilaterally in undertaking humanitarian relief action.98 Further, the right 
to act is also recognized in the case of rebel-held territory. Torelli makes the observation that: 
Article 3 common to the four Conventions constituted a veritable legal revolution 
because it meant that each State agreed, in the humiliating situation in which its authority 
was flouted, that its relations with the sector of the population rebelling against it would 
thencebnh be governed by international law.99 
That is, the government of a state cannot stop humanitarian action in a part of its ruritory which 
it does not actually control. Thus, an aid organization need only obtain the permission of the 
rebel authorities on the ground (such as happened in the case of the cross border relief operations 
in Eritrea and Tigre province in Ethiopia during the &mine and civil war). Yves Sandoz has 
argued that Article 3 "'in practical terms authorizes the ICRC (or any other impartial 
humanitarian body) to enter a territory without the agreement of the government that still 
represents the entire State intemationally.'"1~ In addition, even when a government denies that 
an armed conflict is occurring, Sandoz writes that the ICRC "'could not forswear its action in a 
large area of the territory of a state over which the government has lost control simply because that 
government denied the obvious.'"'0~ With respect to medical assistance, the Medico-Legal 
Commission of Monaco has maintained that 
in non-international armed conflicts, under Artide 3 common to the four Geneva 
Conventions, a non-governmental medical organization is entitled to perform its activities 
in territory controlled by any governmental or non-governmental parry provided that it 
has obtained the prior consent of the parry concerned.lo2 
The ICRC has taken great pains to make dear that its activities are neutral and impanid 
and are not aimed at undermining the sovereignty of the state in which it is operating. Because of 
this, there is a great reluctance on the part of the ICRC to be involved in any operation which uses 
outside military forces as escorts for aid convoys which could (perhaps correctly in some cases) be 
interpreted as fivoring one side or thc other. Thus, the concept of humanitarian access is useful 
98~ichael Bothe, 'Relief Acrions: The Posidon of the Recipient Snrc,"in Ftiu Kalshovcn, ed., histing thr Vicrinu 
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because it divorces humanitarian aid from larger political and military considerations, including 
threats to sovereignty, focusing on civilian victims instead. However, some within the ICRC do 
question whether, in fact, maintaining a right to assistance and access does not call into question 
rraditional concepts of sovereignty. Certainly, insofar as a state is obliged to accept assistance in 
situations where it cannot provide for the needs of its populations itself, certain responsibilities 
with respect to individuals within the state are added to the rights normally associated with state 
sovereignty. Thus, one official maintained that lCRC action is nor a threat to stare sovereignty 
because the evolving concept of sovereignty includes such activities.1°3 There is thus a certain 
body of law -- rehrred to as international humanitarian law -- which provides for a right to receive 
humanitarian assistance, a right to offer such assistance, and, according to some interpretations, 
and right to provide such assistance regardless of the wishes of a government. 
The UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), which plays a major role in 
providing humanitarian relief is also reluctant to portray its activities within countries of origin as 
any kind of intervention or invasion of sovereignty. One UNHCR officid rightly pointed out 
that UNHCR cannot "intervenen in a country,l04 and this is certainly correct insofar as I have 
characterized intervention as involving forcible action. Another noted that while some its activities 
may be characterized as "intrusions," it is not identified as a sovereignty issue by UNHCRI05 Yet 
another official, while articulating the idea of sovereignty involving duties as well as rights, also 
expressed the view that UNHCR could not attack sovereignty head-on. Put of this has to do 
with the hct that UNHCR is dependent upon the international community for f i n a n d  support. 
Further, however, he expressed concern that we not undermine the state as the basis of 
international society. That is, whiIe he recognized an expanded notion of sovcrcignty which 
includes responsibilities toward citizens, and while also recognizing that individuals are part of an 
international community outside of one's state borders, he also noted that undermining the state 
1031ntetvicw with lCRC official, November 1993. 
IMlntcrview with UNHCR offinal. November 1993. 
1051nrerview with UNHCR official, November 1993. 
would undermine international stability.106 One can thus see how far the sovereignty discourse 
reaches. Even some who see significant problems with the sovereignty paradigm rei@ one of the 
main tenets of the discourse -- the centrality and necessity of the state -- in order to create a 
particular kind of system in which human rights and humanitarian action can be ordered. Yet, 
this reification, even when it includes humanitarian aspects, still reinforces the idea of an 
international community with rigid loci of power and authority which, I would argue, corresponds 
less and less to the way more m d  more people are experiencing the world. 
Yet, men though UNHCR and other organizations do not publicly portray their work as 
challenging sovereignty, this is, indeed, what they are doing in some instances. In fact, as one 
UNHCR official suggested, we may be at a point where "the UN continues to do lip service to 
national sovereignty while acting as if national sovereignty were not really a concern."l07 The issue 
of interndly displaced persons -- those who are in refugee-like situations within the borders of 
their country of origin -- is one of the most signifiant issues which has confronted UNHCR in 
recent ytus.108 UNHCR has been involved with aiding the internally displaced, although it has 
been in the context of an agreement with the government. Sometimes, howwer, this agreement 
may be not completely voluntary. For example, in the case of the Iraqi Kurds, the situation which 
produced the agreement to allow UN aid and protection to Iraqi Kurds (and others) was not 
particularly auspicious for a purely voluntary decision. First, Iraq had just been soundly defeated 
in a war. Second, rhe countries which dek ted  Iraq had announced their intention to create a safe 
haven for the displaced. As Howard Adelman observes: "One possible inference is that the Iraqis 
were compelled, if not i n d u d ,  ro sign the UN agreement lest the de hcto infringements on Iraqi 
sovereignty otherwise be legitimized."lC'9 That is, Iraq engaged in an act of sovereignty -- allowing 
foreign troops onto its soil (the same troops which had just defeated it in a war) -- to maintain a 
fiaion that its sovereignty was not being violated. 
l"lnterview with UNHCR official, November 1993. 
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Perhaps this kind of situation is what led one individual at UNHCR to argue that 
sovereignty and problems of consent are "mirage questions."110 That is, consent to gain access on 
the part of UNHCR and other governmental bodies to IDPs and others in need may not be as 
hard as some might think. In addition, however, he pointed out that NGOs are usually already 
on the ground in situations where UNHCR wants to gain access. One instan& where NGOs had 
success where agencies tied to intergovernmental organizations have had less success in gaining 
access was in Ethiopia In this instance, a wide variety of NGOs, in cooperation with the aid wings 
of rwo rebel organizations, provided aid to millions of starving Ethiopians against the wilt of the 
Ethiopian government. In fact, the government did all that it could, including bombing aid 
convoys, to prevent this aid from getting through. Much of this aid was provided at least 
somewhat covertly by governments, but it was NGOs which carried out operations, crossing into 
Ethiopia from the Sudan. Thus, one could say that states were silent co-conspirators in 
undermining the sovereignty of a government which was deemed to have violated its duties 
toward its people.111 As the Refugee Policy Group has obsewed, "innovative individuals and 
organizations, inside and outside of the UN system, have found ways around the constraints of 
sovereignty,"' ' 2  
One organization which has argued for a right of humanitarian access and which has acted 
on that perceived right is MCdccins du Mondc. It has carried out clandestine, unsanctioned 
humanitarian activities in such places as Afghanistan, El Salvador, South Africa, m d  E~hio~ia.113 
Another French medical group, MCderins sans Frontitrs, has been engaged in simiIar activities. 
Both of these groups, as well as the French humanitarian movement in general, have been spurred 
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on by the involvement of Bernard Kouchner, formerly the French Minister for Humanitarian 
&in who has argued that providing humanitarian assistance is both a right and a duty."4 In 
ha, however, even bebre Kouchner became part of the French government, ic had been at rhe 
forefront on this issue. For example, in October 1987, the French President stated: 
As suffering can be experienced by any individual, it is universal. The right of victims to 
bc succoured when they call for help, and to be succoured by volunteers who see 
themselves as professionally neutral in fulfiling what has come to be known as "the duty of 
humanitarian intervention" in situations of extreme emergency, will certainly be included 
one day in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. For no State can be considered 
sole proprietor of the sufkring it causes or harbours.1'5 
Over the past few years, the General Assembly has passed several resolutions regarding 
humanitarian assistance. At the urging of Fnnce, the General Assembly adopted resolution 
43/13 1, encided "Humanitarian assistance to victims of natural disasters and similar emergency 
situations." Although this resolution did try "to get states to acknowledge responsible use of stare 
sovereign ty.... [and] reflected political pressure to enhance international activity benefiting 
persons..."ll" that is, trying to reinforce the marriage of responsibility and rights in sovereignty 
-- it nevertheless also refirmed the primacy of state sovereignty and territorial integrity. In 
1990, it passed resolution 451100 which discussed the necd to crate humanitarian corridors for 
relief assistance. While not &using specifidly on the issue of consent, it nevertheius pointed to 
one way in which issues of access might be worked out.l17 One instance where such negotiated 
access was successful, at least for a while, was Operation Lifeline Sudan. In 1989, &er having 
expelled aid workers, Sudan invited them back in. It allowed aid agencies to enter parts of Sudan 
controlled by rebel forces. The operation only lasted about six months. However, it led to a 
situation which prompted the Sudanese Minister of Social Wclfae to remark: '"WC have, in 
effect, conceded sovereignty over a large part of our territory to the United Nations.'"l~~ Thus, 
'I4~ee Ibid. Sec also h a r d  Kouchncr and Mario krar i ,  & D w o i r d s n g ~ c :  pat-on In &,er rnortrir! (Paris: 
Dendl, 1987). 
15Qyotcd in TortclE. p. 229. 
1 ' 6 ~ a s e  and Fotytk, pp 15-6- 
117~orrelli, p. 245. 
118~uoted  in Lrry  Minur. Hlcmnnitarianism Unkr Siege: A Crin'cuf Rcvinu of Operation LiJrlinc S d n ,  
(Trrnton, NI: Red Sca Prcss, 1991): 99. 
while he also said thar such sovereignty could be reclaimed, this rvas a recugnition that in order to 
deal with a grave situation within Sudan's borders and meet its obligations inherent in sovereignty, 
the governrnenc had to agree CO accivicies which undermined that sovereignty. Aid workers were 
wenrually expelled, and continue to be denied acccss on and off by the Government, which has 
renewed its war against insurgents in the south. Yet, this was J s o  an iridication that the 
international mood is changing with regard ta what constitutes responsible conduct toward one's 
citizens. 
The General Assembly also passed resolution 461182 in 1991, which states that 
'humanitarian assistance should be provided with the consent of the affected country ...." This is 
significant because consent is weaker than an active request from a government. In the case of 
Iraq, while the agreement stated that UN activity was on the basis of a requat from Iraq, in reality 
Iraq just provided pro fotma conscnt. In addition, one wuld make the argument that as long as a 
government did not actively object to humanitarian action it has provided consent. Further, that 
passage made a rekrencc to 'the consent of the a fkcd  country" rather than to the consent of the 
government. This raises the possibility that the people of a country, through some other 
representative than the govcrnment, could request humanitarian assistance and that the UN could 
respond based on that requesr, regardless of what the government wanted. That is, the 
sovereignry of the people could override the sovereignry of the sure. 
In ha, numerous individuals involved with carving out humanitarian activities have noted 
that the international wmmunicy in general, and especially hose in the Third World which have 
been the most jealous guardians of their sovereignty, have taken a slightly softer line. That is, 
white the G77 countries have seen humanitarian access as a challenge to their sovereignty, many of 
them are becoming less adamant with regard to preventing such aass .  This is especially the case 
in Africa, where more states are willing to accept such interference on humanitarian grounds. The 
issue of sovereignty does not come up to the same cxtcnt that it used to only a few years ago.119 
' l 9  lntewiews with UN and US officials, October and November 1993. 
Perhaps this is because aid agencies do not frame the issue in terms of incursions on sovereignty, 
and thus some countries are more willing to provide access. This does not mean, however, that 
such activities still do not pose challenges to the theory and practice of sovereignty. Indeed, such 
activities do rake questions regarding the content and extent of sovereignty such that sovereignty 
is in a state of 'permanent evolution* according to one official at the ICRC (which has not been 
confiontational on the issue of so~ereigncy).'2~ 
However, even if the conceprual questions regarding access and sovereignty do not arise, 
there are, nonetheless, still significant operational issues, especially in the context of internal 
conflia. The problems are perfecrly illustrated in the m e  of Bosnia-Werzegovina. Even though 
UNHCR and other agencies had a right to gain access to affected popdations, they were unable 
to because they were physically blocked by one of the parties to the conflia which was not 
upholding its responsibilities under international humanitarian law. That is, even though 
organizations such as the ICRC and UNHCR go to great pains to portray their operations as 
purely humanitarian and neutrallZ1 (harder for UNHCR when the UN also has troops on the 
ground or has otherwise intcrccdcd in a significant way in a conflict), in many instances they are 
still unable to gain humanitarian access to afFected popdations. The main operational problem, 
then, is that while the international community has the right to gain access, it has not, at the same 
time, demonstrated the will, except on a couple of occasions, ro ensure that humanitarian aid gets 
to where it is needed through the use of force. As one UN official put it, human rights has won 
the struggle with sovereignty but does not know what to do with the victory.'22 
With respect to international and stare practice, then, one can identie severd difftrent 
contradictory trends with respect to humanitarian access and intervention. One can point to the 
UN Charter and ways in which is has been interpreted to find a right for the UN to intervene on 
humanitarian grounds. Further, over the past few years it has intervened in a few situations which 
1201ntcniov with ICRC official, Novernbrr 1993. 
lZ1 interviews with ICRC. UNHCR officials. November 1993. 
lUIntcrviov with UN official, Novcmbcr 1993. 
have had significant humanitarian components. Yet, the foundation for such acrivity has been 
threats ro international peace and security, not human rights, and thus human rights have not been 
cast as coming into conflict with and overriding state sovereignty. At the same rime, however, it is 
obvious that humanitarian concerns have taken precedent over state sovereignty. With regard to 
humanitarian access, there is a body of Iaw which recognizes'the right of individuds to receive 
humanitarian aid and which requires that governments accept that aid. And, there has been some 
shifi on the part of those most resistant to claims of access in the not too distant past toward more 
acceptance of responsibilities in this regard. Yet, this has not kept other operational issues from 
preventing such access from taking place. What is needed, then, is a succinct statement of the 
conditions under which humanitarian intervention and access can take place. First, however, we 
must consider a few of the other moral issues with regard to humanitarian intervention. 
M o d  Issues 
A paper like this cannot hope to address the many moral questions associated with the 
issues of human rights, sovereignty, and humanitarian intervention. What folIows will be an 
overview of the core issues. 
Until very recently, the debate over humanitarian intervention has been premised on the 
ucistence of a particular and widespread view of state sovereignty which insulates a state from 
intervention and which should only be violated in the most extreme circumstances, if even then. 
Most of the discourse has been about legal issues, as outlined above. However, those particular 
issues are not the only relevant ones, nor are they necessarily the best arguments with respect to 
finding a legitimate basis for humanitarian intervention. Although there have been many 
developments in international human rights and humanitarian law this century, international law is 
still based upon state action and acceptance. Thus, accepting legal positivism means 
acknowledging that, for the most part, states do not have limits on their power unless they accept 
those restrictions. And, those that accept such restrictions usually are not the ones who will be 
targeted for intervention in the first place. 
Others would like to rely on natural law to i d e n t i ~  restriaions on state power and to 
provide a basis for intervention. That is, some turn to scriptures or other teachings from religious 
thought, or to a supposed natural order of things to find a basis for basic human dignity as a 
natural and absolute good However, this is problematic because its basis cannot be pointed to in 
any concrete way. Saying it derives from god helps little because there are so many different 
views of religion that arguing something derives from god is highly problematic. Basing a law on 
a supposed natural order of things beyond religion does not get one much further, for how does 
one identify such an order? 
This may seem excessively nihilistic. However, if instead we realize that our realities, our 
ways of interpreting the world are socially constructed, and thus imbued with social purpose, we 
can recognize that any view of law or any social idea, such as sovereignry, is contingent, but the 
firmness or ephemeral nature of this contingency is based upon the idea, structure, or institution 
we are concerned about. This is as true in law as in other realms: "Statesocieties do not have any 
inherent legal powers .... To claim legal power, as much for a state as for any private citizen, is to 
acknowledge social purpose."123 One might conclude, therefore, that states may be restricted in 
their conduct at least insofar as they violate this social purpose. 
Investigating this social purpose lads to the conclusion that sovereignty, rather than being 
focused on the rights of governments, should, instead, be focused on the relationship of 
individuals to sovereign entities -- states -- and the righrs contained therein. It also requires us to 
look both inward from the state, or downward to a lower level of aggregation, and ourward, or 
upward to encompass wider portions of the international community. 
Theoraically, states exist for the well-being of their inhabitants. The primary function of 
states is that of protection. In other words, the state exists to ensure that its citizens u e  able to live 
their lives free from the fear that an outside force will interrupt their lives.124 A reasonable 
extension of this would be that the inhabitants of a srate should also be as free from internal 
1 2 3 ~ h i l i ~  Allon, Ercnonia: New Ordcrfir U New WO& [New York: Oxford University Press, 1990): 256. 
1z4 0 f  course with the incrascd pcrrncabibility of  borders, it is hard for the rate to carry out even rhis function. 
persecution as from external persecution. For, there would be no reason to protea people from 
external threats if they were mistreated at home. Thus, the social function of states is to ensure 
the ability of people to live. 
If, then, the state exists only for the purpose of enabling the individuals who comprise the 
state to live their lives relatively peacefully, and for no other purpose, then one &not say that 
sovereignty ultimately rests with the state. Rather, it rests with individuals within the state. They 
may turn over part of their sovereignty to the state as a condition for protection and to enable the 
state to engage in activities which will provide for various needs of the individuals, but, ultimately, 
this is only a loan which, theoretically. can be called in whenever the state is not fulfilling the 
conditions implicit in the loan. 125 
If sovereignty rests with individuals what does this actually mean! In other words, are 
there certain rights which go along with this sovereignty -- fundamental human rights? As I have 
noted, there are many such rights recognized within the realm of positive international law. 
However, for purposes of this discussion, I contend that recognizing the state as a socially 
constructed institution with the social purpose of providing security fbr its inhabitants would be 
incomprehensible without at the same time linking that social purpose to each and every 
individual within its realm. In other words, since the social purpose of the state is to enable its 
citizens to live, then it makes sense to recognize that social purpose as a right for each person. 
States may hold these rights in trust, but cannot violate them for rakon d'ttaz. 
Thus, the right to live is the most basic right. In addition, individuals are not only 
protected from abuse and assured of basic protections, "the people" are seen as sovereign. This is 
the concept of "popular sovereignty" -- the state must be beholden to the people. As the UDHR 
states, the basis of authority is the will of the people. It determines a states legitimacy: 'Political 
legitimacy arises fmm the people's will -- it does not descend deductively from the Westphalian 
1 2 5 ~ h i s  is similar to various social contract theories. However, whereas k k e  used natural law to provide n base for 
the intrinsic rights of pmple over statc-centric positive law, I want to suggest that thex rights a n  be derived from the 
social purpose of the state itself nrha than a nebulous and unidentifiable natural order of things. 
~rinciples of state sovereignty."126 Of  course, determining the wili of the people is 
problematic.127 To a large excent (although possibly not in every circumstance), this leads to 
various conceptions of democracy to determine this will. Regardless, the state is nothing more 
than the sum of its parts. 
One might also expand the concept to include the right to live in a certain way. One part 
of this right would be freedom from torture and other persecution -- such as unwarranted 
detention, discrimination, or mass movements of populations, which, while not necessarily 
threatening the actual life of an individual -- although in many instances it might, such as in a case 
where people were deprived of food -- precludes the individual from using his or her right to live. 
Further expanding this right would indude the right to what Michael Watzer calls a "common 
life" -- in other words the right to self-determination. the ability to decide how you will lead your 
life socially, culturally, etc. There arc, of course, limits to this, especially when one 
group's "common life" infringes on another group's "common life." This probably comes closest 
to the true meaning of the nation-state -- a group of people who have certain things in common 
socially, culturally, and linguistically and who have established a "common life" together. 
Territorially boundaries might (contingently) be put around this group to protect the inhabitants' 
fledy chosen, noninfringing way of life.128 It is the existence of such a common life that claims to 
sovereignty and nonintervention are founded upon. Thus, we have three building blocks of 
sovereignty -- people, the people, and peoples (chose pursuing a common Iife). 
What is important here is chat if a government violated any of these rights -- and 
rhercbre was not carrying out its social function -- it codd be dedared illegitimate and the people 
could d l  in their loan of sovereignty. Philip Allott provides a similar view: 
If you claim to have a legal power, if you seek ro act on the basis of a legal power, you 
acknowledge the legal system which creates the power and which confers it on you, and 
1261awrcnce T ,  Farley, PLbircim and Sourrtignr~: Tht Crisi~ ofPolitica! IILgitirrmcI, ((Boulder: Westview Press, 
1986): 145. 
127 Even d&ning who 'the people" are is problematic and can be m cxcrcix in margirulization. 
128Scc Michael Walur,jwand Unjuu Wan, New York: Bvic Books, 1977, pp. 53-8. 
you acknowledge that the power is in principle limited, and you acknowledge the specific 
limits of the power-'a 
Thus, those who are acting within the realm of the socially constructed state must accept the 
purposes of that entity in order to be able to daim Legitimacy for their actions. 
Within the above framework, however, the place of the individual in the world as a whole 
is still murky. The space outside national boundaries is perceived as somehow different from the 
space enclosed by constructed, yet ephemeral, boundaries. Is this necessarily the case? Of course 
hot. Those in power over the centuries have created an illusion of an "inside" and an "outside." 
Inside the state, there is a feeling of belonging (usually) and a feeling that "we're all in it together," 
and there are limits (at least within cenain societies) to what might be done. Outside, there is nor 
the same feeling of comradeship, and the limits on state action are not the same. 
Yet, this dichotomy can be seen as the contingency it is. Benedict Anderson writes that 
national communities arc "imagined communities" which are "both inherently limited and 
sovereign." The nation "is imagined because the members of even the smdlest nation will never 
know most of their fellow-members, meet them, or even hear of them, yet in the minds of each 
lives the image of their mmrnunion."l30 These communities, however much power they may have 
in the minds of their citizens, are ideas, constructed within the minds of those citizens. There is 
nothing "natural" about them, although they may seem as such. And, in fact, national 
communities are just one of a number of communities we each recognize as having some sort of 
daim to our loyalties. We may say "my country right or wrong," but we also may feel similar 
feelings about our state or province, our region, our city, our neighborhood, or even non- 
territorially-bound entities. Some of these might even be more important than our parricular 
country. So why not also go the other way? A feeling of being European exists dong with 
nationalist sentiment within the particular countries that comprise Europe. And Europe is just as 
much a creation as is France or Germany. It  should not, then, be too g ra t  a step to dso imagine 
129Allot1, p. 31 3. 
130~cnedict Anderson, Imginrd Cornmrtnitjts: Refictions on ht Origin$ and Spnad of Nationalin. (New York: 
Vcm, 1991): 6. 
the entire earth as an encompassing community. We are not familiar with most of the people 
within this imagined community; rather, the scale is just different. Further, this need not be our 
only allegiance; we can still keep our other allegiances to our nation, our province, our city. What 
changes in this perspective is that those who are citizens can also be considered as humans. This 
involves, in other words "dethron[ing] the statist paradigmn131 where people are defined in 
relation to their state rather than in relation to each other and the wider global community. 
I will take one other step in this constructivist view of comrnuniry. Above, human rights 
were tied to the social purpose of the state. Similarly, we can investigate the social purposes of 
international institutions. These institutions are created by states in order to deal with 
interdependence and permeable borders. States, as e~tablished above, have as their social purpose 
providing a decent environment for the individuals within the borders of the state to live. Since 
intanarional institutions are created by entities with a social purpose, they must also be tied in 
with that socid purpose. Thus, individuals can be tied to international institutions a d  to each 
other within a framework which recognizes them as humans as well as citizens. They are citizens 
within a global community as well as within national (and other) communities, and this means 
that rhe community has certain responsibilities to its citizens, regardless of the (imagined) 
state in which they reside. 
The implications for the discourse on humanitarian intervention are far-reaching. The 
most fundamental question with respect to responding to violations of human rights is whether 
there is a right or a duty on the part of some outside entity to intervene to stop the atrocity. I 
havc already argued that there is a right to intervene, at least on the pan of the United Nations. 
Genocide and other human rights abuses violate the social purpose of the state. When this 
happens, the government becomes illegitimate because it cannot daim that it is working within the 
social framework which provides it with its rights and duties in the first place. But what about an 
actual duty or responsibility to intervene? As Walzer points out: "If rights don't require us to 
'3' Richard Fdk, Rcti&IidngIn#nrotiod LW, (Amcs, Iowa: l o w  Sure University Press, 1989): 10. 
intervene ... then it is difficult to see why they should be called rights."'32 It is more than just 
rights, though, which justify and require humanitarian intervention, it is acts "that shock the moral 
conscience of the world."l33 
In addition to tying the individual to the state, I have also argued that the individual is 
connected to the larger global community. There are many types of internationa! organizations 
creared by states. Because they are created by entities with a social purpose (states) they must also 
be tied in with that social purpose in various ways. They thus have an obligation to ensure that 
social purpose is carried out. When the social purpose is violated within a particular state, the 
international community, which has been developed along the lines of states and thus must 
support the social purpose of those entities, must respond to the violations. The nature of the 
response will depend upon the nature of the sector of the international community. Thus, the 
United Nations, which has both a recognized interest in human rights, as well as the ability to 
undertake the forceful actions under discussion, has an obligation to take these actions. 
Further, such humanitarian intervention should not be conceived of within the 
conventional terms of intervention: 
Governments and armies engaged in massacres are readily identified as criminal 
governments and armies (they are guilty, under the Nuremberg code of "crimes against 
humanityn). Hence, humanitarian intervention comes much closer than any other kind of 
intervention to what we commonly regard, in domestic society, as law enforcement and 
police work.13 
This is, indeed, how any kind of humanitaria intervention must be viewed -- as a police action. 
The domestic analogy can be overdrawn, but here it is appropriate. Domestic police enforce the 
laws and, thwreticdly, the common moral code of society. At the international level, it is next to 
impossible to find a transcendent global morality. Yet, I havc identified a way to provide fbr a 
certain minimum level of moral conduct with respect to states. Therefore, the intervening entity 
would be enforcing the common morality of the world with regard to the social purpose of states 
132~ichael Walzer, T h e  Moral Standing of Stares: A Response to Four Critics," Philomphy &Public Afiiirr, 9 
(Spdn 1980): 223. 
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Finally, those providing aid must observe neutrality. This is a primary component of 
International Humanitarian Law which provides fbr a right to receive and provide assistance. That 
is, the organization providing aid must not side with or against the government or other parties 
involved in a conflict. Yet, thcre may be times when a situation is so grave that an organization 
cannot keep silent about the situation. This will be espccidly so in cases where providing aid has 
become a long-term response and the situation rquires some other sort of action. The question 
becomes whether providing aid actually helps to support the underlying conditions which has led 
to the humanitarian crisis and whether publicizing the situation, while possibly inducing stronger 
action -- intervention -- would also hurt those in nccd. This becomes a question because to the 
extent that gaining humanitarian access is an operational problem rather than one of sovereignty, 
the actual operational ability to provide aid may be undermined or disrupted by various parties if 
they are criticized. Many organizations maintain that they have to work with strict neutrality; in 
fact, they would not be able to operate without it. Yet, others say that they have a responsibility 
to criticize human rights abuses wherever they occur. Doing so, however, may also mean that 
their ability to provide humanitarian aid is severely circumscribed. While neutrdiry, in general, 
should be observed, there is probably also room for some organizations to vioIate that neutrality in 
certain circumstances, ersentiafly those which might require intervention. 
?he conditions under which humanitarian intervention may be legitimately contemplated 
are much stricter and the criteria must be more precise because the possible consequences are 
much more severe than in the case of humanitarian access. They are as follows:~3~~136 
135~he  following uitctia parallel traditional just war theory in a number of respects. For exampte, che National 
Conference of Catholic Bishops rquires that the following principles be met when deciding whahcr or not a war is just: 
l )  just cause [or widespread gross violations of human tighw]; 2) competent authoriry [multilateral action]: 3) 
comparative justice; 4) tight intention [overriding humanitarian motive]; 5) lasc resort [ o t~us r i on  of other remedies]; 6) 
probabiliry of success [related partially to limited action]; and 7) proportionality (limited action]. In addition, two 
conditions must be met in fighting a w r :  8) proporcionalicy [limited aaion] and 9) discrimination [limited action]. 
However, I do  not consider just wu thmry to be panicuivly useful or relevant in assersing the issues discussed in this 
paper or in the wider context of  a nuclear-filled world. Space considerations preclude an in-depth analysis of the 
rclcvana of just war theory. However, a few observations are in order. First, while this may not have been the origina1 
intent of Augustine and Aquinv when they first put forth their just war formulations sevad centuries ago, most recent 
dixucsion ofjust war theory has becn used to justify various wars and interventions (witness the US invasion of Panama in 
1989 named "Operation Just Caw") rather than as a resrraint on the use of violcncc. Second, one of the main criteria of 
just mr theory is chat of right inrcnrion, which means that any killing (of civilians for example) must not be intended, 
even though it may be foreseen. So, cvcn though one knows rhar many people arc going ro die, this is beside the point 
(as well as international law, especially with respect to genocide). This police action differs from 
military aaion in this regard. It is not for the expansion of state power or for economic or 
ideological reasons, but to enforce international civility. 
Thus, beyond the rights, duties, and obligations we can find in positive international law, 
we can also point to a basis for a right and a duty of humanitarian intervention within the very 
concept that governments use to shield themselves from intervention -- sovereignty. What comes 
next, then, is to delineate rhe circumstances under which such intervention should be carried out, 
by whom, and in what manner. 
Criteria for Humanitarian Access and Intervention 
I have made a distinction between access and intervcntion. Access has a focus on providing 
humanitarian aid to a needy population by a wide array of agencies and organizltions, and 
hopefully will not require a significant military operation alongside. In addition, it cannot address 
larger political issues. Humanitarian intervention, on the other hand, has a wider focus which may 
go beyond aiding needy populations and may involve wider political and military issues. Thus, 
while there is overlap berwcen the WO, thcy are still somewhat conceptudly distinct, and thus the 
conditions under which they may be c n g e d  in may be somewhat different. 
The conditions under which humanitarian organizations may provide aid are 
straightforward. The primary condition is, of course, that there must be a needy population, such 
as one ficing mass starvation. This, afkr all, is the conceptual focus of humanitarian access. This 
usually occurs in times of civil conflict, although other instances of humanitarian disasters may 
also provide rhii condition. In addition, the government must be either unable or unwilling to 
provide for the needy population. It is at this point that a right to ignore the wishes of the 
government is legitimate because it is not fulfilling its obligations to its citizens. If, however, a 
government is truly willing but unable, then relief may be negotiated with the government 
without resorting to claiming a right to humanitarian access. 
2 
1 )  Widcsprrad Gross Violations of Human Rights The primary criteria for contemplating 
humanitarian intervention is the presence of massive atrocities, either imminent or actually carried 
out by a government. This would indude mass killings, deprivation of food, or other activities 
which result in massive loss of life. No precise number can be put fonh,137 but o n e  a situation 
reached thc point where many thousands or millions of lives are being lost or at risk of being lost, 
this criteria would probably be met. In addition, a situation where a significant portion of a 
specific ethnic or rehgious group were threatened -- &ling under the definition of "genocide" in 
the Genocide Convention -- would qualify for humanitarian intervention.138 
2 )  Mulrilatml Action As discussed above, unilateral action is illegitimate for a number of 
reasons. Any action should be taken by either the UN or a regional organizarion.139 Depending 
on the siruation, one might be more preferable than the other. Of course, both the UN and 
regional organizations have been essentially unable to carry out this type of action, and even with 
(except insub  as it relates to other criteria) w long as it is not intended. Thitd, in today's nuclear world, it is hard to rte 
how jucr war theory may be qpliablc. although some, such as Willurn V. O'Brien, sec the possibility of limited nuclear 
war w jurtifiai within the just mr tradition. Fourth, as Robcrr H d m a  points out, iust wu theory w p c s  the morality 
of violence which would occur in a just war without further scruriny. Finally, humanitarian intervenrion, w discussed 
above does not need W bc concdvsd of in terms of a jw war. Rather, it should be d.wught of as global police action. This 
may xrm like semantic games, but if the world is evolving in the direction of a global civil society where human rights 
u e  upheld as global vlfucr and protected as a result of global decisions. thm, appropriating rhe domestic analogy. 
humanitarian intervention would not be in the mold of p war between states, but nther as police mforcernent. albeit 
police enforcement on a larger sale. Agood recent overview of just war thcoryan bc found in Jean &thke Ushuin, ed., 
jwt War Thll; (New York: New York University Press, 1992), including the essays by Roben Holma 'Can War & 
Morally Justified? Thc Just War Theory" and William V. O'Brien "The Chdlcnge of War: A Christian Realist 
Pmpcctivc." 
1~6Thesc critcria arc similar, but not identical. to criteria put fonh by a number of other observers. See, for 
example, Buyla, pp. 598-607; Barabm Ha& &WC& a d  Hvmmr Righn: Inten~ionrrl  Lqdund Political IIIJUI, Vol 
20, No. 3. Monograph Series in World Afhirs, (Denvcr: Univerricy of Denva, 1984): 245; Sornuajah, esp. 73-7 (focuss 
on insnncer of self-determination and secusion; David J. Scheffer, 'Challenger Confronting Collecdve Security: 
Humanitarian Intwenrion," in P o f i G f f  War C&ge$ to h UN Colksriw Searig S y m :  Thm I r i  on thc Inue 
o f H - h  Intrrunrtiorh (Washington, DC. United States Innitutc of Pact, 1992): 1-14. 
I3'h H&(p. 12) poinn out: "It is difficult enough m identify the elements of genocide - a diverse set of deadly 
strategies on which mtes tmbark to eliminate certain unwanted people - without requiring an answer to the question, 
'how many?' A criterion which rquircs 'counting the d a d '  implia chat genocide [or oher  widespread gross violations 
of human rights] unnor be diagnosed until after the fact, and thus defeats the purpose of recognizing and, more 
ambitiously, stopping practices." 
13a~his paper hu not addressed rfK question of monitoring or deciding when genocide or other gross violations of 
human righa are occurring. Recognizing. publicizing, and getting relevant decision-makers to recognize and act upon 
such a b w s  a n  be a co rnp l i ad  and sometimes politically-laden procers. On detining and recognizing genoeide sec 
Helen Fein, ed.. &rik Wuxb, (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1992). See also liarff, pp. I417 for some d t h c  
shortcoming of the Minirion of genocide in the Genocide Convention. 
'39~innemore argues that the intanadonal normative structure with regard to multilatmlism has evolved over the 
past fifty years, 'making mulrilatenlism not just aanctivc but irnpcrarive." Finncmote, p. 38. 
some hopeful signs, this places significant restrictions on any type of humanitarian intervention. 
When the UN has taken forceful action in the past, it has authorized member states or regional 
organizations ro acr on its behalf. If the UN became truly serious about forceful action in defense 
of human rights, the most expedient arrangement would be to have a stand-by force -- possibly 
individually recruited by the UN and under the direct command of the UN -L already assembled 
and available ro be deployed in short order. In fict, there have been various proposals for the 
creation of such a force. However, this is unlikely to occur in the foreseeable future. Thus, any 
action is likely to take the form of a coalition, such as in the Gulf War. However, unlike the Gulf 
War, the participant states in a coalition should have an overriding humanitarian motive, rather 
than being in the position of acting as mercenary forces for the UN, fulfilling their particular 
agendas in the process. Otherwise, the decision to take action, as well as the way in which it is 
carried out, can be corrupted. 
3) O v d i n g  Humanitarian Motive The motives for intervening must be humanitarian in 
nature. If individual states were permitted to engage in this action it might be very difficult to 
satisfj this condition. Howcver, considering that any action will be more like a police action 
enforcing the laws and morality of a universal or regional organization at the behest of such an 
organization, made up of many different states with different interests, this will not be as much of 
a problem. Thcre may be cases where concrete humanitarian issues arc combined with security 
issues. In fact, this may be the most likely scenario for intervention. In this case, as long as the 
humanitarian motives are still primary and not ancillary or used as a pretext for intervention, 
security interests, such as regional stability, may be present. As Akhavan writes: 
humanitarian intervention must be evaluated not only within the confines of inter-State 
relations and interests, but rather, primarily on the basis of the participation and interests 
of those who a n  the actual victims of gross and flagrant human rights violations such as 
genocide.'& 
4)  Limited Action and Proportionalig The use of violence to stop violence is of dubious 
moral quality at best, and great care must be taken that the force used is proponiond to the 
14Akhavm, p. 42, 
situation. Since humanitarian intervention is being sanctioned only in response to mass violence 
and killing, the question of using violence for situations which are not violent, or relatively not 
violent, will not come up. However, the force used should be as "surgical" as possible -- realizing, 
at the same time, that such precision is impossible -- so that only the absolute minimum 
amount of force is used, and that which is used is proportional to the situation which is being 
remedied. Also, the fbrces should only stay as long as it takes to stop the mass violence and loss 
of life. Sometimes, this might mean deposing a d i n g  despot and perhaps putting a country 
under UN trusteeship for a time. 
5 )  Respect for SclJrDetemination The intervening entity must respect the values and 
institutions of the people. It cannot attempt to impose its own political or other system on the 
people. It must "enter ... into the purposes of [the] ptople"l41 and not try to frustrate them. 
6 )  Ourromc B m r  &an Prcviou~ Situation Related to respect for self-determination, the 
in the course of reviewing international law and recent practice, as well as reconceptualizing the 
position of people within the framework of sovereignty, I have demonstrated several things. First, 
individuals have a right to receive humanitarian assistance. Second, international organizations 
have a right, in certain instances, to gain access to provide such assistance without regard for the 
wishes of the government as well as co engage in more &-reaching intervention in certain rypes of 
instances. Third, the international community may have not only a right but an obligation to 
provide assistance and to intervene in cases of widespread gmss violations of human rights. 
O n  a more conceptual plane, individuals can be conceived of as having a different 
relationship with the wider community beyond the state, and states have obligations toward 
individuals within the wider community beyond their supposed sovereign realm. That is, the state 
is no longer the absolute mediating focus between the individual and the international 
community. Rather, the welfare of individuals is now the direct concern of the international 
government which comes into power must have the support of che people -- be democratic, community, and states, as members of the international community, have obligations towards 
however one defines that, or indude some notion of popular sovereignty -- and the situation in those individuals when the internacionl community determines they are in need, 
general must be "better." These rights and obligations come into play when a state, or at least certain actions of a 
7) Erhaustion of Other Rmrdics The intervening entity must try all other avenues of state, has been found to be illegitimate. That is, when a state violates human rights or cannot 
peaceful conflict resolution before resorting to force. These would include UN and other meet its obligations vis a vis its citizens, those citizens have a right to ask for and receive assistance 
resolutions and diplomatic missions, as well as economic surctions.142 Yet, there might also be and the international communiry has a right and obligation to respond in a manner most befitting 
instances where, because the &reat is so massive and the situation is evolving so rapidly, that there the particular situation, which may involve, in some way, ignoring the sovereignty of the state in 
might not be time to implement a wide array of other measures before rcsoning to more tbrceful fivor of the sovereignty of individuals and groups. This is the most direct and damaging 
action. challenge to the sovereignty discourse with its traditional notions of srate sovereignty, and 
represents a significant paradigm shift in the way the relation~hip between the individual and the 
Sovereignty and the Legitimacy of Hum;mitarian Intemntion international community is conceived, as well as the way in which the legitimate loci ofpower and 
Human rights abusing governments rely on sovereignty as a shield to protect them from authority are constructed. 
scrutiny and to enable them to carty on their practices free from outside interference. However, In practice, this challenge has been taken up by the international communiry, albeit in 
ambiguous and sometimes contradictory ways. In the cases of Bangladesh and Uganda, India and 
141 Walzer, jurt and Unjust Wan, p. 104. 
1 4 2 ~ ~ ~  Hnrff, pp. 79-80 for a clear dclination of what these actions should be in the cuc of potential or actual Tanzania engaged in what some see as illustrative cases of humanitarian intervention, dthough 
gcnocade. 
Thus, it may be that even as a normative revolution is taking place with regard to the 
rights and responsibilities inherent in claim to sovereignty, the will of the global community to 
adjust to this reorientation has not kept up. The basis for the right and obligation to undertake 
forceful action on the part of the globd community to protect human rights is established. What 
has not been established is the will of that wider community to act on this responsibility in a 
coherent and principled manner. 
neither country used this argument. In the case of the Kurds, the international community 
responded, somewhat reluctantly, with a dear violation of Iraqi sovereignty. In Somalia, to the 
extent that one could talk about Somali sovereignty, the inrernational community, again, took 
action on humanitarian grounds which undermined the norm of nonintervention. In both of these 
cases, findings of threats to international pace and security (based, especially, on refbgee flows) 
rather than specific humanitarian criteria were used to justify the interventions. In other instances, 
there have been cases where UNHCR and many NGOs have either pushed the limits of state 
sovereignty or ignored it altogether when attempting to gain humanitarian access to affected 
populations. Somecimes this is recognized by humanitarian practitioners as violating sovcrcignry, 
but other times a more benign gloss is put on these aaiviries so as nor to raise rhc ire of 
governments. In still other situations, the international community has done little to deal with 
widespread violations of human rights, even when there seems ro be consensus that it can and 
should act. 
Humanitarian intervention in the posr-cold war era hsrs been extremely seleaive, and will 
probably continue to be so. Some would arguc that this fact, itself, is enough to 4 1  into question 
the legitimacy of such actions. However, this is too simplistic a reaction. It is likely that the 
world will continue ta see more Rwandas and Bosnias and Somalias. The international 
communiry is not going to intervene in certain powerful states, nor is it going to respond in the 
same h h i o n  to all humanitarian emergencies. Forsaking action in all situations because the 
powerful states may only choose to act in a few is an abdication of the sesponsibility which 1 have 
cried to lay out in this paper. Coherent and consistent responses to 111 situations would enhance 
the legitimacy of humanirarian interventions and allay the fears of some regarding inconsistency. 
However, we are not living in particularly coherent times, and this situacion is likely to continue 
for some time as the emerging global order begins to take shape. Perhaps we should accept 
whatever human rights protection we can get, while at the same time recognizing it is not enough 
and hope that as the international cornm~lnicy recognizes its responsibilities it also decides to act 
upon them. 
